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Investigating Integrated Domestic Violence Courts:  
Lessons from New York * 
 
I. Introduction 
Domestic violence1 is a pressing social policy issue in both Canada and the United States. In 
Canada, spousal violence accounts for more than half of all police-reported family violence, and 
over 10% of all police-reported violent crime.2  The actual rates of domestic violence are much 
higher; recent Canadian studies show that only 22-30% of spousal violence victims reported the 
abuse to police.3 Over eight in ten victims of police-reported spousal violence in Canada are 
female.4 Between 2000 and 2009, spousal homicides accounted for 16% of all solved homicides 
in Canada, and nearly half (47%) of all family-related homicides.5 In the U.S., the overall rate of 
domestic violence in 2008 was 2.6 victimizations per 1,000 persons aged 12 or older.6 That same 
                                                
* For their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author thanks Aya Gruber, Holly Maguigan, 
Madhavi Sunder, the participants in NYU’s Hauser Global Fellows Forum, and anonymous peer reviewers for the 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal. I also thank Leslie Tutty for her leadership in the evaluation of Calgary’s DV Court, 
which informed my approach to this project, and NYU’s Hauser Global Fellows program for funding support.   
1 My specific focus in this paper is on intimate partner violence. In spite of its shortcomings, I will use the term 
“domestic violence” because my subject is state responses through “domestic violence” courts. I also use the terms 
“victim” and “offender”, which are not intended to suggest a lack of agency on the part of survivors of intimate 
partner violence nor a pre-determination of guilt. These terms are those typically used in the literature on DV courts, 
and serve as a shorthand to avoid the range of different terms that apply in the criminal and civil justice systems in 
Canada and the U.S. For a critical discussion of terminology see Joanne C. Minaker and Laureen Snider, “Husband 
Abuse: Equality with a Vengeance?” (2006) Can  J Criminology and Criminal Justice 753. 
2 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 2009) at 24 [hereinafter Family Violence in Canada 2009]. 
3 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 2011) at 11 [hereinafter Family Violence in Canada 2011] (22%); Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, Measuring violence against women: Statistical trends (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2013) at 10 
[hereinafter Measuring violence against women 2013] (30%). See also Robin Mason, Rosana Pellizzari, Lorna 
Grant, Donna Cherniak, Britt Moore, “Intimate Partner Violence Consensus Statement” (2005) 157 SOGC Clinical 
Guidelines 365 at 369-70.  
4 Family Violence in Canada 2009, supra note 2 at 24-25.  
5 Family Violence in Canada 2011, supra note 3 at 32. The rate of spousal homicides against women is about three 
to four times higher than the rate against men (ibid at 33). A recent Ontario report found that 80% of homicides in 
the domestic violence context involve female victims, and 12% child victims. See Office of the Chief Coroner, 
Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, 2011 Annual Report (Ontario: Office of the Chief Coroner, 2012) at 5.   
6 Shannan Catalano, Erica Smith, Howard Snyder, and Michael Rand, Female Victims of Violence (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 2009, NCJ 228356) at 1. Broken down by gender, there were 4.3 victimizations per 1,000 females age 12 
or older, and 0.8 victimizations per 1,000 males age 12 or older. To compare these numbers to Canada, in 2007 the 
rate of police-reported spousal violence was 188 per 100,000, or 1.88 per 1,000 persons.  
2 
year, 45% of female homicides in the U.S. were perpetrated by intimate partners.7 Over 200,000 
people are victimized by domestic violence each year in New York State, and domestic violence 
cases make up 20% of the caseload of criminal courts.8 Underreporting of domestic violence is 
also a significant issue in the U.S.9 
In addition to straining judicial and other government resources, domestic violence 
results in myriad health, safety, and other social and economic consequences for its primary 
victims, women and children.10 Certain populations in both countries are especially vulnerable to 
the harms of domestic violence. Although there are some arguments to the contrary,11 women 
make up the vast majority of victims of domestic violence, and some women – indigenous 
women, racialized and immigrant women, women with disabilities, lesbians, young women, and 
7 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes, and consequences on her visit to the 
United States of America, A/HRC/17/26/Add.5 (6 June 2011) at para 9 [hereinafter Report of the Special 
Rapporteur]. The rate of spousal homicide against women was twice that against men (ibid).  
8 Robyn Mazur and Liberty Aldrich, “What makes a domestic violence court work? Lessons from New York” 
(2003) 42 Judges J 5 at 6. 
9 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 7 at para 13. In both Canada and the U.S., underreporting is most 
acute amongst women who experience social and economic inequality, such as immigrant and racialized women, 
women with disabilities, and lesbians. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, ibid at paras. 54-55, 59-61; Canadian 
Panel on Violence Against Women, Changing the Landscape: Ending Violence-Achieving Equality (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) at 214; Dianne Martin and Janet Mosher, “Unkept Promises: Experiences of 
Immigrant Women with the Neo-Criminalization of Wife Abuse” (1995), 8 Can J Women & L 3; Jennifer Koshan 
and Wanda Wiegers, “Theorizing Civil Domestic Violence Legislation in the Context of Restructuring: A Tale of 
Two Provinces” (2007) 19 Can J Women & L 145 at 167-168.   
10 See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur, ibid at para 18-21; Mason et al, “Intimate Partner Violence Consensus 
Statement”, supra note 3 at 370-372; World Health Organization, Global and regional estimates of violence against 
women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and nonpartner sexual violence (Geneva: WHO, 
2013) at 5-8. 
11 In Canada, see for example Family Violence in Canada 2011, supra note 3, reporting on the 2009 General Social 
Survey (GSS). Like the 1999 and 2004 Surveys before it, the 2009 GSS documents similar self-reported rates of 
domestic violence amongst female and male respondents. However, the methodology of the GSS has been critiqued 
(see e.g. Walter DeKeseredy and Molly Dragiewicz, Shifting Public Policy Direction: Gender-Focused Versus Bi-
Directional Intimate Partner Violence (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2009)), and the results contradict many other 
studies showing women to be the overwhelming victims of domestic violence (see e.g. see Family Violence in 
Canada 2009, supra note 2 at 25, and Measuring violence against women 2013, supra note 3 at 8, finding that rates 
of intimate partner violence were almost four times higher for women than men). The GSS itself found that females 
are more likely to suffer multiple incidents and more serious forms of domestic violence, and to sustain injuries 
(Family Violence in Canada 2011, ibid at 9-10, 13). In the U.S., see Emily Sack, “Battered Women and the State: 
The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy” (2004) Wis L Rev 1657 at 1711-1713, for a discussion of 
the debate about the gendered nature of domestic violence [hereinafter “Battered Women and the State”]. The 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, ibid at para 8, notes that in 2008, the rate of intimate partner victimization for 
women in the U.S. was over five times the equivalent rate for men (citing Catalano et al, supra note 6).   
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poor women – face particular risks.12 Domestic violence has been recognized as an urgent 
women’s human rights issue both domestically and internationally.13  
In recognition of the harms of domestic violence and the problems with traditional legal 
approaches to this social problem, there have been extensive legislative, administrative and 
judicial reforms since the 1970s and 1980s in the United States and Canada. These reforms 
followed upon calls by women’s groups, shelters and anti-violence activists to treat domestic 
violence seriously,14 and by justice system personnel to develop strategies for dealing with the 
particular challenges of domestic violence cases.15 Most recently, specialized domestic violence 
courts (“DV courts”) have been established in Canada and the U.S. as a response to the 
challenges presented by domestic violence cases.16 The latest innovation, and one which is still 
                                                
12 In Canada see Family Violence in Canada 2011, ibid at 11; Measuring violence against women 2013, ibid at 6. 
See also the Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, supra note 9 at 59. In the U.S., see Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, ibid at paras 50-52, 56, 62.     
13 See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur, ibid; Canadian Panel on Violence Against Women, ibid; UN General 
Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 20 December 1993, GA Res 48/104; 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Rec No 19, Violence Against Women 
(11th Sess 1992); World Health Organization, supra note 10 at 4; UN Secretary-General, UNiTE to End Violence 
against Women, on-line: United Nations, <http://endviolence.un.org/>. 
14 In the U.S., see e.g. Samantha Moore, Two Decades of Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: A Review of the 
Literature (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2009) at 1; Donna Coker, “Crime Control and Feminist Law 
Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review” (2001) 4 Buff Crim L Rev 801 at 803; Deborah Epstein, 
“Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges and the Court 
System” (1999) 11 Yale J L & Feminism 3; Sack, “Battered Women and the State”, supra note 11; Elizabeth 
Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) at 3-8. In Canada, 
see e.g. Dawn Currie, “Battered Women and the State: From the Failure of Theory to a Theory of Failure” (1990) 
1(2) Critical Criminology 77; Frances Salvaggio, “K-Court: The Feminist Pursuit of an Interdisciplinary Approach 
to Domestic Violence” (2002) 8 Appeal 6 at 8.   
15 In the U.S., see Mazur and Aldrich, supra note 8 at 5-6, and in Canada, see Leslie M. Tutty, Jane Ursel, and 
Janice Lemaistre, “The Verdict on Specialized Justice Responses to Domestic Violence”, in Jane Ursel, Leslie M. 
Tutty and Janice Lemaistre, eds, What's Law Got To Do with It? The Law, Specialized Courts and Domestic 
Violence in Canada (Toronto: Cormorant Books, 2008) 272 at 275 [hereinafter “The Verdict”]. Both sets of authors 
refer specifically to the role of judges and other justice personnel in the development of DV courts.  
16 For overviews, see What’s Law Got to Do With It?, ibid (which contains essays on a number of Canadian DV 
courts) and Sarah Picard-Fritsche, Melissa Labriola, Samantha Moore, Chris S. O'Sullivan and Michael Rempel, A 
National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2011) (providing an 
overview and analysis of DV courts in the U.S.). 
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relatively unique to the U.S., is integrated domestic violence courts (“IDV courts”), where 
criminal matters are heard alongside family and civil matters in a one judge / one family model.17 
Using Manhattan’s IDV Court as a case study, this article explores the benefits and 
challenges of IDV courts with a view to whether they should be considered for adoption in 
Canada. In particular, it examines whether IDV courts can improve upon the traditional 
Canadian approach of dealing with criminal, civil and family matters separately.  New York is an 
apt jurisdiction for a case study, given its large number of IDV courts and the fact that it is 
“considered a leader in the integrated court movement”,18 as well as the availability of 
evaluations and literature on IDV Courts in New York.19 Although an IDV Court commenced 
operations in Toronto in the summer of 2011, there has been little opportunity to observe or 
evaluate its operations to date.20  
The article proceeds as follows. In Part II I analyze relevant literature on domestic 
violence law reforms in Canada and the U.S., including literature on DV and IDV courts, to 
situate my case study. Part II also establishes the problems presented by the traditional approach 
                                                
17 See e.g. Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, ibid at 5.   
18 Elizabeth MacDowell, “When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and Court Pluralism” (2011) 
20 Texas J Women & L 95 at n 1. 
19 A number of evaluations were released by the Center for Court Innovation in July, 2012. See Sarah Picard-
Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives in an Integrated Domestic Violence Court (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 
2011) [hereinafter Litigant Perspectives]; Shani Katz and Michael Rempel, The Impact of Integrated Domestic 
Violence Courts on Case Outcomes (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2011); Sarah Picard-Fritsche, Amanda 
B. Cissner and Nora K. Puffett, The Erie County Integrated Domestic Violence Court: Policies, Practices, and 
Impacts (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2011) [hereinafter Erie County]; and Amanda B. Cissner, Sarah 
Picard-Fritsche and Nora K. Puffett, The Suffolk County Integrated Domestic Violence Court: Policies, Practices, 
and Impacts (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2011) [hereinafter Suffolk County]. See also Francesca Levy, 
Tim Ross, and Pamela Guthrie, Enhancing Safety and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence: Voices of Women in 
the Queen’s Integrated Domestic Violence Court (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2008) (research conducted at 
the request of the Center for Court Innovation (at 11)). The Center for Court Innovation is a public/private 
partnership between the New York State Unified Court System and the Fund for the City of New York, and 
“functions as the court system’s independent research and development arm, creating demonstration projects” such 
as community courts, drug courts, domestic violence courts, and mental health courts.” See on-line: Center for Court 
Innovation, <http://www.courtinnovation.org/who-we-are>.  
20 See Ontario Court of Justice, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Overview”, on-line: Ontario Court of Justice, 
<http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/integrated-domestic-violence-court/overview/>supra note 18. An evaluation of the 
Toronto IDV Court is in progress by Nicholas Bala, Rachel Birnbaum, and Peter Jaffe, funded by the Women’s 
Domestic Violence Directorate, Department of Justice. This Court is further discussed in Part IV.  
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to dealing with domestic violence cases in multiple forums and the need for examining 
alternative models.  In Part III I discuss my criteria for assessing the utility of IDV courts as an 
alternative model, including access to justice, avoiding unintended consequences, and systemic 
impacts. I then present the results of courtroom observations and interviews I conducted in 
Manhattan with IDV court personnel, advocates for victims, offenders, and children, and other 
key stakeholders, which explore the benefits and challenges of the New York IDV court model 
from the perspective of those involved in its operations.  Part III also compares these 
observations to the outcomes of recent IDV court evaluations in New York state. In Part IV I 
discuss how New York’s IDV Court model could respond to some of the problems associated 
with the separate criminal, civil and family approaches to domestic violence in Canada, in 
addition to noting some challenges that should be addressed by Canadian jurisdictions seeking to 
implement IDV courts and some areas for future research.    
 
II. Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: A Review of the Literature  
A. The 1970s and 1980s: Criminal, Civil and Family Law Reforms  
It took some time for domestic violence to be recognized as a criminal matter, and the 
enforcement of the criminal law continued to be lackluster well into the 20th century.21 In the 
1970s and 1980s, women’s groups in Canada and the U.S. lobbied for domestic violence to be 
treated seriously, with some success. Legal responses to the traditional deferential approach to 
domestic violence have taken place in the criminal, civil and family law realms. Alongside these 
                                                
21 For a discussion of the historical approach to domestic violence, see e.g. Betsy Tsai, “The Trend Toward 
Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation” (1999-2000), 68 Fordham L Rev 
1285 at 1288-1290; Epstein, supra note 14 at 9-11.  
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legal reforms, shelters, battered women’s services, and treatment programs for batterers have 
also been developed.22  
In the criminal realm, one of the early reforms in both countries was governments’ 
adoption of mandatory arrest, charging and prosecution laws and policies.23 Specialized police, 
prosecution and probation units were often developed alongside these laws and policies.24 In the 
civil realm, many jurisdictions enacted legislation providing for civil protection orders in 
domestic violence cases. 25 Both countries have also seen the use of tort law remedies by victims 
of domestic violence,26 as well as rights-based claims seeking to hold government actors to 
account for their responses (or lack thereof) to domestic and other forms of gender-based 
violence.27 Other civil reforms have been instituted by governments in the area of family law, 
                                                
22 The Violence Against Women Act, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), as revised, provided new federal 
funding in the U.S. for, amongst other things, programs and services in the area of violence against women. See 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 7 at para 67. For a discussion of funding in this area in Canada, see 
Marina Morrow, Olena Hankivsky, and Colleen Varcoe, “Women and Violence: The Effects of Dismantling the 
Welfare State” (2004) 24(3) Critical Social Policy 358 and Koshan and Wiegers, supra note 9 at 151-152.    
23 In Canada, mandatory charging and prosecution policies were adopted by all provinces and territories in the 
1980s. See Trevor Brown, Charging and Prosecution Policies in Cases of Spousal Assault: A Synthesis of Research, 
Academic, and Judicial Responses (Ottawa: Dept of Justice, 2000). In the U.S., these reforms occurred during the 
same time period. Mandatory arrest was generally achieved via legislation, and no-drop prosecution as a matter of 
policy. See Sack, “Battered Women and the State”, supra note 11 at 1668-1674.  
24 See Sack, ibid at 1673; Tsai, supra note 21 at 1291; Leslie Tutty, Jane Ursel and Fiona Douglas, “Specialized 
Domestic Violence Courts: A Comparison of Models” in What’s Law Got To Do With It?, supra note 15, 69 at 75 
[hereinafter “A Comparison of Models”]. Criminal law developments regarding domestic violence also include 
reforms to the laws of bail, evidence, and sentencing. 
25 In Canada, see e.g. Saskatchewan’s Victims of Domestic Violence Act, SS 1994, c. V-6.02 (Canada’s first civil 
protection legislation), which provides for emergency and longer term protection orders. Similar legislation now 
exists in most Canadian provinces and territories. In the U S., see e.g. New York’s Family Court Act and Domestic 
Relations Law, both of which make provision for temporary and final protection orders. The federal Violence 
Against Women Act, supra note 22, also deals with some aspects of protection orders. See Epstein, supra note 14 at 
12 and Julie Goldscheid, “The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but 
Not Ruled Out” (2005-2006), 39 Fam LQ 157. 
26 In Canada, see e.g. Mooney v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2001 BCSC 419, aff’d 2004 BCCA 402 
(Donald, J.A. dissenting); leave to appeal dismissed [2004] SCCA No. 428, and see Elizabeth Sheehy, “Causation, 
Common Sense, and the Common Law: Replacing Unexamined Assumptions with What We Know About Male 
Violence Against Women or from Jane Doe to Bonnie Mooney” (2006) 17 Can J Women & L 97. For an overview 
of tort claims in the U.S., see Jennifer Wriggens, “Domestic Violence Torts” (2001), 75 S Cal L Rev 121. 
27 In Canada, see e.g. Jane Doe v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police, (1998) 74 OR (2d) 
225 (Div Ct), leave to appeal dismissed [1991] OJ No 3673 (CA) (a sexual assault case). In the U.S., see e.g. Castle 
Rock v Gonzales, 545 US 748, 125 S Ct 2796 (2005); Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al v United States, Case 
12.626, Report No. 80/11 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, August 17, 2011). Human rights 
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particularly in relation to custody and visitation / access where there has been domestic 
violence.28 States have also revised child protection legislation to include exposure to domestic 
violence as grounds for state intervention.29 
Several problems with this round of responses to domestic violence have been identified 
by feminist scholars and those advocating for battered women.30 One strand of critique relates to 
the focus on criminal reforms rather than more structural reforms, and decries the appropriation 
of women’s law reforms efforts by the state to implement a law and order agenda.31 Other 
critiques relate to the ways in which these reforms have been implemented and to inconclusive 
evidence on whether they are working as intended. It is important to note these concerns at some 
length so that unintended consequences can inform future legal reforms in the domestic violence 
context, including those related to DV and IDV courts.  
One concern is that there is conflicting evidence about whether mandatory arrest, 
charging and prosecution policies are effective in preventing domestic violence or may in some 
circumstances result in increased risks to victims, particularly those who are racialized and 
                                                                                                                                                       
remedies against private actors (e.g. employers and landlords) are also an option (Julie Goldscheid, “Advancing 
Equality In Domestic Violence Law Reform” (2002-2003), 11 Am U J Gender Soc. Pol'y & L 417 at 424-425).  
28 In Canada, see Peter G. Jaffe, Claire V. Crooks and Nick Bala, “Domestic Violence and Child Custody Disputes: 
The Need for a New Framework for the Family Court” in What’s Law Got to Do With It?, supra note 15, 254 at 256, 
and in the U.S., see e.g. Leigh Goodmark, “Law is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure? Questioning the 
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women” (2004) 23 St Louis U Pub L Rev 7at 11-13; MacDowell, supra 
note 18 at 113-114 and accompanying notes.  
29 See e.g. Kendra Nixon, Leslie Tutty, Gillian Weaver-Dunlop, and Christine Walsh, “Do Good Intentions Beget 
Good Policy? A Review of Child Protection Policies to Address Intimate Partner Violence”(2007) 29 Children and 
Youth Services Review 1469; Goodmark, ibid at 22. 
30 I focus here on critiques by feminist scholars and the battered women’s movement.  
31 In Canada, see Elizabeth Comack and Gillian Balfour, The Power to Criminalize: Violence, Inequality and the 
Law (Halifax: Fernwood, 2004) at 171;  Currie, supra note 14; Martin and Mosher, supra note 9; and Laureen 
Snider, “Making Change in Neo-Liberal Times” in Gillian Balfour and Elizabeth Comack, eds, Criminalizing 
Women (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2006) 323. In the U.S., see e.g. Coker, supra note 14; Holly Maguigan; 
“Wading into Professor Schneider's “Murky Middle Ground” Between Acceptance And Rejection Of Criminal 
Justice Responses To Domestic Violence” (2003) 11 Am U J Gender Soc Policy 427 at 430; Sack, “Battered 
Women and the State”, supra note 11. 
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poor.32 Further, police bound by zero tolerance laws or policies have sometimes responded by 
arresting and laying charges against women who were trying to defend themselves or whose 
partners allege they were violent, the so-called “dual arrest” problem.33 This may subject true 
victims of domestic violence to criminal, child custody and apprehension, and immigration 
consequences.34 Police have also enforced zero tolerance laws and policies more aggressively 
against marginalized men and women, especially those who are racialized, indigenous, and 
poor.35 Victims have had little autonomy under this approach, and may avoid calling the police 
altogether or face sanctions for failing to cooperate with the prosecution.36 This has been a 
particular concern for women marginalized by race, Aboriginality, immigration and economic 
status, and sexual identity.37  
Similar problems of over-enforcement have occurred with respect to civil protection 
orders in the U.S., with judges making mutual orders of protection that restrain the actions of 
victims as well as offenders.38 In Canada, the reverse problem has been documented, namely the 
under-enforcement of breaches of civil protection orders and criminal zero tolerance laws and 
                                                
32 Most studies concern the U.S. See e.g. Coker, ibid at 814-820; Maguigan, ibid at 434-443; Schneider, supra note 
14 at 184-88; Evan Stark, “Reconsidering State Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases” (2006) 5 Social Policy & 
Society 149 at 151-153. 
33 See e.g. Comack and Balfour, supra note 31 at 152, 170-1; Goodmark, supra note 28 at 23-24; Maguigan, supra 
note 31 at 442-43; Sack, “Battered Women and the State”, supra note 11 at 1680; Snider, supra note 31 at 334. Dual 
arrest refers to the practice whereby the police arrest or charge both the perpetrator and victim rather than decide 
who the primary aggressor was.  
34 See e.g. Comack and Balfour, ibid at 170-171; Coker, supra note 14 at 831-837; Maguigan, ibid at 433. These 
consequences may result when victims engage (or choose not to engage) with the criminal and civil justice systems 
even if they are not arrested and charged. See Koshan and Wiegers, supra note 9 at 168; Goodmark, supra note 28 at 
21-22, 25-28.  
35 See e.g. Coker, ibid at 807-811; Sack, “Battered Women and the State”, supra note 11 at 1677; Snider, supra note 
31 at 334. 
36 See e.g. Coker, ibid at 805-807; Goodmark, supra note 28 at 24; Snider, ibid.  
37 See e.g. Coker, ibid; Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color (1993), 43 Stan L Rev 1241 at 1258-60; Epstein, supra note 14 at 17-18; Goodmark, ibid 
at 36-39; Koshan and Wiegers, supra note 9 at 167-168; Martin and Mosher, supra note 9 at 21, 27; Sack, “Battered 
Women and the State”, supra note 11 at 1679; Snider, ibid. 
38 See e.g. Goodmark, ibid at 24; Sack, ibid at 1682-1684 (both noting that mutual protection orders may be made by 
judges of their own motion). Mutual protection orders have not been a major issue in Canada. See Koshan and 
Wiegers, ibid at 169. 
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policies by police.39 There have also been critiques of the reticence of family courts to take 
domestic violence into account in custody and access determinations, in spite of legislative 
reforms requiring them to do so in some jurisdictions.40 On the other hand, child protection 
workers and courts may enforce neglect laws in adverse ways against women who do not leave 
their abusive partners.41 Offenders (or their lawyers) may also use the criminal, civil and family 
justice systems in ways that perpetuate abuse.42     
At the level of the courts, mandatory charging and prosecution policies often created 
increased caseloads without governments providing the resources to handle the volume.43 
Further, judges generally continued to approach domestic violence cases the same way they 
traditionally had, as this wave of reforms was not aimed at their level.44 As noted by one author, 
“courts have been the last of the justice system components to engage in institutional reform to 
improve the justice system’s impact on domestic violence.”45  
 
B. The 1990s: Specialized DV Courts  
                                                
39 See e.g. Comack and Balfour, supra note 31 at 153 (noting that this was a particular problem on First Nations 
reserves in Manitoba); Koshan and Wiegers, ibid at 168, 173. In the U.S. context, see Goodmark, ibid at 35. 
40 See e.g. Jaffe, Crooks and Bala, supra note 28 at 259-260; Martha Shaffer & Nicholas Bala, “Wife Abuse, Child 
Custody and Access in Canada” (2003) 3 Journal of Emotional Abuse 253; Julia Weber, “Courts Responding to 
Communities: Domestic Violence Courts: Components and Considerations” (2000) 2 J Center for Families, 
Children & Cts 23 at 26. 
41 See e.g. Allison Cleveland, “Specialization Has the Potential to Lead to Uneven Justice: Domestic Violence Cases 
in the Juvenile & Domestic Violence Courts” (2010) 6 Am U Modern Am 17 at 17; Goodmark, supra note 28 at 21-
22; Nixon et al, supra note 29.  
42 See e.g. Comack and Balfour, supra note 31 at 162-169; Goodmark, supra note 28 at 24, 33-34; Peter Jaffe,  
Claire Crookes, & Nick Bala, Making Appropriate Parenting Arrangements in Family Violence Cases: Applying the 
Literature to Identify Promising Practices. (Justice Canada, 2005), cited in Andrea Vollens, Court-Related Abuse  
and Harassment (Vancouver: YWCA, 2010) at 3; MacDowell, supra note 18 at 119; Sack, “Battered Women and 
the State”, supra note 11 at 1731.  
43 See e.g. Moore, supra note 14 at 1; Susan Keilitz, Specialization of Domestic Violence Case Management in 
Courts: A National Survey (National Institute of Justice, 2004) at 9-3; Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, supra note 24 at 85.  
44 See Tsai, supra note 21 at 1290; Robert V. Wolf, Liberty Aldrich and Samantha Moore, Planning a Domestic 
Violence Court: The New York State Experience (New York, NY: Center for Court Innovation, 2004) at 2-3. 
45 Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-3. See also Epstein, supra note 14 at 13; Anat Maytal, “Specialized Domestic Violence 
Courts: Are They Worth the Trouble in Massachusetts?” (2008-2009) 18 BU Pub Int LJ 197 at 93. 
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Specialized DV courts began to develop in the 1990s, and by the late 2000s, there were over 200 
DV courts in the U.S. and dozens in Canada.46 There is a broad diversity of courts in terms of 
their context (urban or rural communities), jurisdiction (civil and / or criminal, felony or 
misdemeanor charges, first appearance or trial court), scope (intimate partner violence or 
domestic and family violence more broadly), and approach (diversion of low risk offenders / 
vigorous prosecution).47  While civil protection order courts are most common in the U.S.,48 and 
there have been some innovations in family courts in Canada,49 specialized DV courts in Canada 
are almost exclusively criminal. In light of that reality, and given that most of the literature uses 
the terminology “DV Courts” to refer to criminal DV courts, I will do the same here.  
Although there is diversity in the origins, structures and operations of DV courts, they 
typically consist of dedicated courtrooms where criminal matters related to domestic violence are 
dealt with on a separate calendar or docket from other criminal cases by specially trained judges, 
prosecutors, probation officers and other staff.50 In the U.S., DV courts are usually staffed by 
dedicated judges, while in Canada DV courts are more likely to have rotating judges.51 Most DV 
                                                
46 Center for Court Innovation, A National Compendium of Domestic Violence Courts (New York: Center for Court 
Innovation, 2009); Moore, supra note 14 at 1; Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, supra note 24 at 80-81. 
47 Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-3; Moore, ibid at 2; Tutty, Ursel and LeMaistre, “The Verdict”, supra note 15 at 275, 
278. One study notes that this diversity is unique to DV courts when compared to other problem solving courts, 
which “have a more clearly delineated structure and widely shared set of core goals, policies and practices”. See 
Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16 at ix. See also Emily Sack, 
Creating A Domestic Violence Court: Guidelines and Best Practices (San Francisco: Family Violence Prevention 
Fund, 2002) at 24-29 [hereinafter Creating A Domestic Violence Court] (discussing the various models of DV courts 
in the U.S.). 
48 Donald E. Shelton, The Current State of Domestic Violence Courts in the United States, 2007 (National Center for 
State Courts, 2007) at 12. Specialized civil protection order courts do not exist in Canada, where applications for 
such orders are typically made in front of Magistrates, Justices of the Peace or in Family or Superior Courts. See 
Karen Busby, Jennifer Koshan and Wanda Wiegers, “Civil Domestic Violence Legislation in the Prairie Provinces: 
A Comparative Legal Analysis”, in What's Law Got To Do with It?, supra note 15, 197 at 207.  
49 See Nicholas Bala, Rachel Birnbaum and Justice Donna Martinson, “One Judge for One Family: Differentiated 
Case Management for Families in Continuing Conflict” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 395 at 405 (discussing family justice 
reforms in several jurisdictions (although relating to high and continuing conflict cases generally and not necessarily 
cases involving domestic violence)).  
50 Moore, supra note 14 at 1; Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16 
at 1-3; Tsai, supra note 21 at 1300.  
51 See Picard-Fritsche et al, ibid. at 1; Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, “A Comparison of Models”, supra note 24 at 75-77. 
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courts have screening processes that allow appropriate cases to be identified, and many attempt 
to intervene in domestic violence matters as early as possible.52 Victim advocates seek to 
promote victim participation in the DV court process by providing information, services, and 
referrals, while defendants’ compliance with orders of protection, treatment programs, and other 
court-ordered conditions are monitored. DV courts also may  involve ongoing collaborations and 
coordination between court personnel and community organizations.53 
Various explanations have been put forward for the development of DV courts in Canada 
and the U.S. First, it is argued that the earlier wave of domestic violence reforms in the 1970s 
and 1980s led to a marked increase in the volume of cases and a resultant burden on the criminal 
courts, and that the rationale for specialized DV courts was largely one of efficiency.54 Many 
sources note the involvement of particular judges or groups of judges and other justice personnel 
in the development of DV courts, working alongside other justice system and community 
actors.55 The development of DV courts is also said to have occurred in response to the unique 
and complex nature of domestic violence cases and difficulties in the ways they had traditionally 
been handled by the courts and other justice personnel.56 Specialized DV courts soon came to be 
                                                
52 Weber, supra note 40 at 24 (describing screening processes) and Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, ibid at 76 (noting the 
focus on early intervention, particularly for low-risk offenders). 
53 Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16 at 2-3, 7; Mazur and 
Aldrich; supra note 8 at 9-10. 
54 See Moore, supra note 14 at 1, Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-3. This rationale is specifically mentioned in relation to 
New York’s plan for DV courts in Tsai, supra note 23 at 1300. See also Catherine Shaffer, “Therapeutic Domestic 
Violence Courts: An Efficient Approach to Adjudication?” (2003-2004) 27 Seattle U L Rev 981 at 993-997, 
undertaking a detailed cost-benefit analysis of DV courts.  
55 In the U.S., see e.g. Mazur and Aldrich, supra note 8 at 5-6, who note the role of “system insiders” and DV 
advocates in the development of DV courts. See also Wolf, Aldrich and Moore, supra note 44 at 3, noting the role of 
a particular judge, Judith Kaye, in the development of New York’s specialized DV courts. In Canada, see Tutty, 
Ursel and Lemaistre, “The Verdict”, supra note 15 at 275, who note the role of judges as “agents of change” in the 
area of specialized DV courts. 
56 Jane Ursel, Leslie M. Tutty and Janice Lemaistre, “The Justice System Response to DV: Debates, Discussions and 
Dialogues”, in What's Law Got To Do with It?, supra note 15, 1 at 12; Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-3; Tsai, supra note 
21 at 1296. Some of the problems identified with respect to domestic violence cases include low reporting rates, 
high rates of charge withdrawal, reluctant victim-witnesses, and high rates of recidivism. See Darcie Bennett, 
Imagining Courts that Work for Women Survivors of Violence (Vancouver: Pivot, 2012) at 11. 
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seen as part of the program of “problem solving” or “therapeutic” courts, which deal with 
complex issues such as addictions and mental health that wind up in the criminal arena.57 
According to one author, the situation of DV courts within the broader movement of problem 
solving courts has helped to provide legitimacy to DV courts.58  
Arguments were also made against the development of specialized DV courts, largely in 
the U.S. Some critics expressed concerns about problem solving courts more generally and their 
departure from the traditional adversarial model of justice.59 Others raised the issue that the 
involvement of judges in the planning and implementation of DV courts, as well as judicial 
training on domestic violence issues, might compromise judicial objectivity and neutrality.60 
Another concern was that a focus on criminal justice reforms and batterer treatment programs 
may draw resources away from services for victims and children, and may intensify some of the 
problems with the criminal justice approach to domestic violence, such as victim 
disempowerment.61   
                                                
57 Moore, supra note 14 at 1; Wolf, Aldrich and Moore, supra note 44 at 5; Tsai; supra note 21 at 1294-1296; Judith 
S. Kaye and Susan K. Knipps, “Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving 
Approach” (1999-2000) 27 W St U L Rev 1. 
58 Moore, ibid. 
59 See Shelton, supra note 48 at 7-8 for a discussion of these criticisms. In Canada, see e.g. Leslie Tutty, Jennifer 
Koshan, Deborah Jesso, Cindy Ogden, Evaluation of the Calgary Specialized Domestic Violence Trial Court & 
Monitoring the First Appearance Court: Final Report (Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 2011) at 62 [hereinafter 
Calgary DV Court Evaluation] and Bennett, supra note 56 at 12 (noting the opposition of defence counsel). 
60 Bennett, ibid at 12; Shelton, ibid at 8; Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-4. On the other hand, concerns have also been 
noted about inappropriate judicial attitudes to domestic violence in spite of training. , and about training being 
“woefully lacking”. See . Lynn S. Levey, Martha Wade Steketee, and Susan L. Keilitz, Lessons learned in 
implementing an integrated domestic violence court: The District of Columbia experience (Williamsburg, VA: 
National Center for State Courts, 2001) at 8-11, 18. See also Rosemary Hunter, “Narratives of Domestic Violence” 
(2006) 28 Sydney L Rev 733, whose research found that traditional attitudes towards domestic violence were fairly 
entrenched even in specialized forums in Australia. 
61 See Bennett, supra note 56 at 13; Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, Loretta Frederick, Barbara Hart, Meredith Hofford, 
“Unified Family Courts: How Will They Serve Victims of Domestic Violence” (1998-1999) 32 Fam LQ 131 at 145; 
Carolyn Turgeon, “Bridging Theory and Practice: A Roundtable on Court Responses to Domestic Violence” (2008) 
1 J Court Innovation 345 at 355; Tsai, supra note 21 at 1314; Ursel, Tutty and Lemaistre, supra note 56 at 12-13. 
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Today, there appears to be broad consensus that the primary goals of DV courts are 
victim safety and offender accountability.62 Other related goals of DV courts discussed in the 
literature include providing a coordinated and collaborative response to domestic violence, 
informed and consistent decision-making, provision of victim services, and efficiency.63 Some 
authors have suggested that various goals of DV courts may be contradictory.64 In particular, 
goals relating to efficiency may conflict with goals that focus on substantive justice concerns, 
although one study found that justice system personnel were able to integrate these goals in 
practice.65  There is also some debate in the literature about the rehabilitative aspect of DV 
courts, with some critics contending that unlike other problem solving courts, rehabilitation 
should not be seen a goal of DV courts because of conflicting evidence on whether batterer 
treatment programs actually work.66 Others argue that reducing recidivism and providing 
deterrence (both individual and general) should be seen as valid goals of DV courts.67 Some 
authors emphasize that in addition to their impact on the individual parties, DV courts also have 
(or should aim to have) societal and systemic impacts on perceptions and norms surrounding 
domestic violence.68  
                                                
62 See e.g. Kaye and Knipps, supra note 57 at 6-7; Keilitz, supra note 43 at 9-5 – 9-6; Richard R. Peterson, 
Manhattan’s Specialized Domestic Violence Court. Research Brief No. 7 (New York: New York City Criminal 
Justice Agency, Inc, 2004); Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16 at 
iv; Turgeon, ibid at 353; Tutty, Ursel and Lemaistre, “The Verdict”, supra note 15 at 277, 278; Weber, supra note 
40 at 26; Wolf, Aldrich and Moore, supra note 44 at 1.  
63 Keilitz, ibid at 9-3 to 9-4; Moore, supra note 14 at 3; Picard-Fritsche et al, ibid at iv, vi. 
64 Rekha Mirchandani, “What's So Special about Specialized Courts? The State and Social Change in Salt Lake 
City's Domestic Violence Court” (2005) 39 Law & Soc'y Rev 379 at 380, 382-384. See also Tsai, supra note 21 at 
1310-1312. 
65 Mirchandani, ibid at 405. See also Deborah M. Weissman, “Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: 
Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local"” (2000-2001) 42 BC L Rev 1081at 1126-1128. 
66 See e.g. Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16 at vi; Wolf, Aldrich 
and Moore, supra note 44 at 11. See also Shelton, supra note 48 at 8, who argues that unlike other problem solving 
courts, DV courts tend to focus on victims’ issues (e.g. safety) more than rehabilitation of offenders. 
67 See Shelton, ibid at 10-11; Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 137. Moore, supra note 14 at 7, notes that 
recidivism may be linked to both treatment and deterrence. 
68 See Dunford-Jackson et al, ibid; Salvaggio, supra note 14 at 16-17; Turgeon, supra note 61 at 367; Weber, supra 
note 40 at 32; Weissman, supra note 65 at 1142. Tsai, supra note 21 at 1303, describes the Dade County Domestic 
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C. Critical Observations on DV Courts  
There is limited critical literature on DV courts to date, particularly in Canada.69  My own 
observations from this review of the literature on DV courts are as follows. First, although victim 
safety and offender accountability are widely stated as the goals of DV courts, it is often unclear 
how these goals are defined, and how they are to be achieved or measured. The Center for Court 
Innovation does provide some elaboration, suggesting that accountability comes from offender 
compliance with court orders such as those mandating treatment, and that victim safety arises 
from the “prompt and effective provision of services”.70 However, there is little attention to how 
the unresolved debate about whether batterer treatment works71 may undermine the goals of 
accountability and safety. The argument that the focus of DV courts on batterer treatment 
programs may take away from resources that would otherwise be allocated to victims72 also 
presents a possible challenge to the stated goals of offender accountability and victim safety.   
A related concern is that the literature is silent on the question of how DV courts relate to 
issues of state accountability. For example, there are no discussions of the role of DV courts in 
responding to the problems with the implementation of zero tolerance laws and policies that arise 
from the actions of police and prosecutors, nor on the over-enforcement of child protection laws 
                                                                                                                                                       
Violence Court in Florida as a good example of a court focused on the community’s role in combatting domestic 
violence, with judges required to participate in community programs.   
69 For DV court literature in the U.S. that includes critical perspectives, see e.g. Epstein, supra note 14; 
Mirchandani, supra note 64; Tsai, supra note 21; Turgeon, supra note 61; Weissman, supra note 65. In Canada, see 
Bennett, supra note 56 at 12-13. 
70 See Key Principles of Domestic Violence Court: Accountability, on-line: Center for Court Innovation, 
<http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/key-principles-domestic-violence-court-
accountability?url=research%2F7%2Farticle&mode=7&type=article> and Spotlight on Victim Safety, on-line: 
Center for Court Innovation, <http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/spotlight-victim-
safety?url=research%2F7%2Farticle&mode=7&type=article>).        
71 See Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 8; Moore, supra note 14 at 7-8; Tsai, supra note 21 at 1312-1314; 
Turgeon, supra note 61 at 347-348, 354; Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, “A Comparison of Models”, supra note 24 at 77-
80.  
72  Bennett, supra note 56 at 13. See however Ursel, Tutty and Lemaistre, supra note 56 at 13, who argue that 
specialized courts might actually lead to expansion of victim services. 
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against victims of domestic violence. A focus on offender accountability at the expense of state 
accountability runs the risk of privatizing the harms flowing from domestic violence.73      
Another observation is that the rights and interests of accused persons do not tend to have 
a very prominent place in the literature on DV courts. This problem has been identified in 
relation to specialized and problem solving courts more broadly, with some literature in that 
context raising concerns about the ways in which a non-adversarial model may impact the rights 
of offenders negatively, and place their lawyers in difficult positions when it comes to their role 
as zealous advocates.74 However, it is not typically raised as an issue in relation to DV courts 
specifically.75 This should concern those advocating for the interests of battered women, as 
women may themselves be accused of domestic violence pursuant to zero tolerance policies and 
the manipulation of the system by actual offenders.76 More broadly, it is important that any 
justice system response protects the rights of accused persons to due process and procedural 
fairness.  
Relatedly, the concerns raised by commentators about the impact of the domestic 
violence reforms of the 1970s and 1980s on those who are racialized, poor,  indigenous, and 
LGBT are also largely absent from the literature on DV courts, especially the institutional 
                                                
73 For a discussion of concerns around privatization in the context of civil domestic violence legislation, see Koshan 
and Wiegers, supra note 9.  
74 See Tamar M. Meekins, “"Specialized Justice": The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New 
Criminal Defense Paradigm” (2006-2007) 40 Suffolk U L Rev 1 at 8, 14; Mae C. Quinn, “The Modern Problem-
Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform” (2010) 31 
Wash U J of L and Policy 57 at 62, 64 (dealing specifically with drug courts).Lack of legal representation for 
offenders is also noted as a concern (Meekins, ibid at 23-24). 
75 A few sources on DV courts do flag due process concerns as important. See e.g. Cleveland, supra note 41 at 18; 
Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 135 (in the context of unified family courts dealing with domestic violence); 
Wolf, Aldrich and Moore, supra note 44 at 2. 
76 On domestic violence victims who are themselves accused, see Avon Global Center for Women and Justice and 
The Women in Prison Project of the Correctional Association of New York, From Protection to Punishment: Post-
Conviction Barriers to Justice for Domestic Violence Survivors-Defendants in New York State (New York: 2011). 
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literature.77 Although some authors mention particular services that have been developed for 
members of marginalized groups who engage with DV courts, the needs and concerns of these 
groups are typically not discussed in terms of the rationales underlying the courts or their 
intended impacts. This is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that, unlike the earlier wave 
of domestic violence reforms discussed above,78 DV courts have been advocated largely by 
institutional actors rather than grassroots advocates for battered women.79  
Another critique is that the literature on DV courts tends to be insular in evaluating these 
courts in terms of their impact on the criminal justice response to domestic violence rather than 
as part of a broader justice system response.80 There is some critical literature that raises 
potential problems with segregating domestic violence matters into specialized criminal courts, 
noting that these courts may have the effect of isolating and marginalizing the issues,81 with 
possible consequences on resources.82 Segregation may also serve to (re)privatize domestic 
violence disputes,83 a problem noted above in relation to the lack of focus on state accountability. 
In addition, segregation into specialized courts may deprive non-specialized justice system 
personnel of education and training, and deprive litigants in non-specialized forums of the 
                                                
77 I am referring here to articles by judges, evaluations by institutional organizations, etc. See also Vollens, supra 
note 42 at 19, who notes that “The literature was largely silent on the effects of intersecting oppressions on court 
related harassment and abuse.” 
78 However, the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s were not embraced by all battered women’s activists, as noted in 
Part IIA. 
79 Some authors, e.g. Shelton, supra note 48 at 6, 21 and Tutty, Ursel and Lemaistre, “The Verdict”, supra note 15 at 
275, note the role of women’s and victims’ groups in the establishment of DV courts, however the vast majority of 
the literature identifies the development of DV and IDV courts as driven by the judiciary, government and the legal 
profession. This is not to say that institutional actors cannot be feminists, however. See Mirchandani, supra note 64 
at 396.   
80 For an exception see What’s Law Got To Do With It?, supra note 15, which includes essays assessing the 
criminal, civil and family justice system responses to domestic violence in Canada.  
81 Weissman, supra note 65 at 1128-1129; MacDowell, supra note 18 at 114-115. 
82 Bennett, supra note 56 at 8; Weber, supra note 40 at note 37 and accompanying text. 
83 Weissman, supra note 65 at 1116-1117. See however MacDowell, supra note 18 at 97-99, 102, who notes the 
important symbolic and systemic effects of criminal courts in domestic violence cases.  
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benefits of this expertise.84 On the other hand, some judges may be reluctant to be assigned to 
DV courts for philosophical or workload related reasons, and may be reluctant to receive training 
on domestic violence issues.85 As the next section will show, there are also problems presented 
by the fragmented approach to criminal, family and civil domestic violence issues, whereby 
different issues are heard by different courts operating as separate silos, which criminal DV 
courts cannot themselves resolve.  
 
D.  Problems with the Fragmented Approach to Domestic Violence Cases  
Domestic violence raises multiple, intersecting and complex legal issues related to criminal 
responsibility, protection of victims and children, and family matters such as custody and access, 
support, property division, and child apprehension. Many of these issues, particularly in the 
family law realm, require ongoing engagement between the parties over time in light of changing 
circumstances and the need for enforcement, giving rise to the possibility of continuing conflict 
and litigation.86 In both Canada and the U.S., these issues have traditionally been dealt with in 
multiple forums: criminal, civil and family courts, which may also have different levels (for 
example provincial and superior courts) and divisions (for example civil family courts).  
There are many problems that arise from the fact that domestic violence victims, 
offenders and their children must navigate multiple forums to address all of these issues. One 
difficulty is the lack of communication between civil, family and criminal courts and different 
divisions within these courts. For example, recent reports on domestic violence in BC, Alberta 
                                                
84 Weissman, ibid at 1128-1129; MacDowell, ibid at 114-115. Even with specialized intake and screening processes 
to divert matters into DV courts, some cases may slip through the cracks and be litigated in regular courts 
(MacDowell, ibid at 114). Some domestic violence cases may also fail to meet the eligibility criteria for DV courts.   
85 Cleveland, supra note 41 at 18-19; Maytal, supra note 45 at 223-225; Weissman, ibid at 1113-14. 
86  Liberty Aldrich and Judy Harris Kluger, “New York's One Judge--One Family Response to Family Violence” 
(2010) 61 Juv & Fam Ct J 77 at 79; Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, supra note 49 at 401. 
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and Ontario found little information sharing between courts and with other justice system 
personnel, and a lack of accurate information obtained from parties about the existence of related 
proceedings and orders.87 In both Canada and the U.S., it is noted that these sorts of information 
gaps may lead to inconsistent and conflicting decisions and protective orders that cause 
confusion about rights and responsibilities and may affect the safety of victims and children.88  
Conflicting orders may also result from the different objectives of the different courts, 
ranging from the best interests of children (which may lead to courts maximizing contact 
between parents and children) to protection of victims and children (which may favour limited 
contact).89 Even within particular levels of court, the fact that different judges may hear different 
matters between the parties can lead to inconsistent orders and difficulty in monitoring and 
enforcing them.90 
Another problem is that multiple proceedings typically result in increased costs to both 
the parties and the justice system, along with delay, particularly in civil/family matters when 
                                                
87 Donna Martinson, Domestic Violence Program Development for Judges: April 2012 British Columbia Community 
Consultation Report (National Judicial Institute, 2012) at 4-5, on-line: FREDA Centre for Research on Violence 
Against Women and Children, <http://fredacentre.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-Hon.-D.-Martinson-
National-Judicial-Institute-April-2012-B.C.-Community-Consultations-on-Family-Violence-Report.pdf>; Mary 
Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Honouring Christian Lee – No Private Matter: Protecting Children Living with Domestic 
Violence (Victoria: BC Representative for Children and Youth, 2009) at 3, 58-9; Tutty et al, Calgary DV Court 
Evaluation, supra note 59 at 71-72; Leslie Tutty, Jennifer Koshan, Deborah Jesso, and Kendra Nixon, Alberta’s 
Protection Against Family Violence Act: A Summative Evaluation (Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 2005) at 56, 66; 
Office of the Chief Coroner, Domestic Violence Death Review Committee,2010 Annual Report (Ontario: Office of 
the Chief Coroner, 2011) at 45. 
88 See e.g. Bennett, supra note 56 at 50; Juliana Dalley, “‘One Family, One Judge’: Towards a New Model for 
Access to Justice for Families Facing Violence in BC” (2013) 18 Appeal 3 at 3; Domestic Violence Advisory 
Council, Transforming our Communities: Report from the Domestic Violence Advisory Council for the Minister 
Responsible for Women’s Issues (Ontario, 2009) at 79; Epstein, supra note 14 at 23-28; Katz and Rempel, supra 
note 19 at 1; Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 7-8; Martinson, ibid at 5; Tutty et al, Calgary DV Court 
Evaluation, ibid.; Members of the violence against women sector, Comments on the Integrated Domestic Violence 
Court Proposal (Ontario, 2011) at 2, on-line: Ontario Association of Interval and Transition House Workers;  
<http://www.oaith.ca/assets/files/Publications/Family%20Law/IntegratedDVcourt-response.pdf> [hereinafter 
“Violence against women sector”]; Justice Geraldine Waldman, “The What and Why of the Proposed Integrated 
Domestic Violence Court” (2011), on-line: Family Lawyers Association, < http://www.flao.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/Integrated_Domestic_Violence.pdf>  at 1.   
89 Cleveland, supra note 41 at 17; Martinson, ibid at 5. 
90 Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, supra note 49 at 403-404. 
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criminal proceedings are prioritized.91 Fragmentation of domestic violence issues also may allow 
perpetrators to engage in judge shopping and bring multiple applications in different courts to 
further harass and abuse victims, further increasing costs, stress for victims and children, and 
possible substantive injustice.92 When cases move between judges and forums, this undermines a 
holistic approach to domestic violence issues and may not provide sufficient oversight over 
procedures which may be inappropriately used in domestic violence cases, such as mediation and 
other forms of alternative dispute resolution.93 Victims and children may have to tell the same 
stories multiple times, resulting in possible revictimization.94 All of these issues can increase the 
level of contact and conflict between the parties and increase the risk of further violence and 
harm.95 These problems may be exacerbated for marginalized women and their children, 
including those who live in poverty, face immigration related consequences, do not speak 
English, have disability related accessibility issues, and lack access to legal representation and 
other services.96  
 As noted above, criminal DV courts cannot resolve most of these issues, which occur as a 
result of the multiplicity of different proceedings in different forums. However, IDV courts arose 
at least in part in response to some of these problems, as the next section will discuss.   
 
E. The 2000s: IDV Courts 
                                                
91 Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, ibid at 398, 402; Martinson, ibid at 5; Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 7; 
Waldman, supra note 88 at 1. 
92 For example, victims may concede matters such as child custody and access to avoid conflict. See Vollens, supra 
note 42 at 8, 25. See also Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, ibid at 397; Domestic Violence Advisory Council, supra 
note 88 at 75-6; Levy, Ross and Guthrie, ibid at 8; Martinson, ibid at 6; Waldman, ibid. 
93 Aldrich and Kluger, supra note 86 at 79-80. 
94 Martinson, supra note 87 at 5. 
95 Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, supra note 49 at 404, 411; Martinson, ibid at 4-5. 
96 Martinson, ibid at 6-7, 10-11; Vollens, supra note 42 at 19-20. 
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At the same time that specialized criminal DV courts were developing in the U.S., there was a 
call for unified family courts (UFCs) by members of the legal community as a way to respond to 
the fragmentation of family law matters in different courts.97 UFCs combine different levels of 
court jurisdiction in one body to deal with a range of family law matters, but do not typically 
include jurisdiction over criminal matters nor specialize in domestic violence issues.98 IDV 
courts in the U.S. are said to have grown out of this movement towards UFCs, and also to build 
on the experience with criminal DV courts.99  
IDV courts share many of the same characteristics of criminal DV courts, but hear 
criminal, civil and family matters in one setting. There is also diversity amongst IDV courts, and 
not all have unified jurisdiction over all matters. The Center for Court Innovation identifies eight 
key principles associated with IDV courts: “one courtroom for all related cases, comprehensive 
resources for families, compliance monitoring, advocacy for domestic violence victims, judicial 
training, community partner involvement, honoring the integrity of each case type, and 
measuring outcomes.”100 Some IDV courts have separate intake units, while in others matters are 
screened and transferred to the IDV court from criminal, civil and / or family courts according to 
certain eligibility criteria.101 These eligibility criteria often relate to the types of cases that the 
litigants have in progress in different courts, but they may have a qualitative aspect as well.102 
                                                
97 In the U.S., see e.g. Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19 at 1. In Canada, see Evaluation Division, 
Office of Strategic Planning and Performance Management, The Unified Family Court Summative Evaluation: Final 
Report (Ottawa: Dept of Justice Canada, 2009) at 7-8.   
98 See Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61. 
99 Aldrich and Kluger, supra note 86 at 79. See also Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19; Katz and 
Rempel, supra note 19 at 1; Picard-Fritsche, Cissner, and Puffett, Erie County, supra note 19 at 2-3; Cissner, Picard-
Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 2-3.  
100 Center for Court Innovation, Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Key Principles (n.d.), on-line: Center for 
Court Innovation, <http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/IDV_FACT_SHEET.pdf>at 1-3. 
101 See e.g. Levey, Steketee and Keilitz, supra note 60 at 16 (describing the DV Intake Centre in Washington D.C.’s 
IDV Court), and Melissa Breger, Lee Elkins, and Jane Fosbinder, New York Law of Domestic Violence, vol 1, 2d ed 
(Thomson/West, 2010/11 suppl.) at 35 (describing the transfer process for New York’s IDV courts).  
102 See e.g. Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 25, noting how the Suffolk County 
IDV Court selects cases in part based on the benefit that families will receive from the IDV Court.  
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Once in the IDV court, criminal, civil and family matters are typically heard sequentially to 
preserve the integrity of different case types, although courts try to ensure that litigants’ matters 
are heard on the same day.103 IDV courts may also be especially attuned to facilities issues and 
litigant needs relating to privacy, on-site child care and supervised visitation services, and 
safety.104  
Like DV courts more generally, IDV courts are said to focus on the goals of victim safety 
and offender accountability.105 These are the stated objectives of IDV courts in the U.S. as well 
as Canada, where Toronto’s IDV court materials emphasize the objectives of “increase[d] 
accountability of the accused and enhance[d] … complainant’s safety.”106 These goals may seem 
surprising in that they are typically associated with the criminal justice system, yet IDV courts do 
not deal with criminal matters alone. However, it has been argued that IDV courts seek to protect 
victims’ safety by minimizing contact with the offender through orders of protection and by 
ensuring that such orders do not conflict with those made in the criminal and family law 
context.107 Others suggest that civil courts may set norms and send messages to offenders about 
the unacceptability of domestic violence,108 so the inclusion of a civil component in IDV courts 
would not undermine the goal of offender accountability. The one judge-one family model may 
                                                
103 In New York, cases may be calendared by family or by area of law, but criminal cases typically proceed first in 
either model. See Suffolk County, ibid at 28-29 and Picard-Fritsche, Cissner and Puffett, Erie County, supra note 19 
at 21.  
104 Epstein, supra note 14 at 33; Levey, Steketee and Keilitz, supra note 60 at 20, 24; Sack, Creating a Domestic 
Violence Court, supra note 47 at 37-38. 
105 See e.g. Office of Policy and Planning, New York State Courts, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: 
Overview”, on-line: New York State Unified Court System, 
<http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/idv/home.shtml> (referring to enhanced services to victims and 
offender accountability as goals of IDV courts); Picard-Fritsche, Cissner and Puffett, Erie County, supra note 19 at 
3; and Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 3.  
106 See Ontario Court of Justice, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Overview”, supra note 16; Waldman, supra 
note 88 at 1. 
107 Levy, Ross, and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 21.  
108 MacDowell, supra note 18 at 98. 
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also protect the interests of children by managing litigation-related conflict between the 
parents.109  
There is also an access to justice aspect to IDV courts, as they seek to minimize the 
number of trips to different courts, delay, and associated costs that victims and offenders 
otherwise experience in order to obtain the broad sorts of relief required in domestic violence 
situations.110 The goal of avoiding hearings in multiple courts, along with the goal of increasing 
consistency in court orders, is also related to institutional efficiency considerations.111 Other 
goals of IDV courts include informed judicial decision-making, connection to services and 
resources, comprehensive and holistic remedies, and coordination and collaboration among 
criminal justice, child welfare, and community agencies offering services and assistance.112  
There is some critical literature in the U.S. on IDV courts that raises possible concerns 
with this type of model.113 For example, the increased information sharing in IDV courts 
amongst various justice sector and service providers may make victims more susceptible to 
losing their children through child protection proceedings, and to other negative family law 
outcomes.114 Information sharing may also pose safety concerns for victims and children unless 
                                                
109 Bala, Birnbaum and Martinson, supra note 49 at 398 (albeit dealing with case management in the family court 
context rather than IDV courts). 
110 See Breger, Elkins, and Fosbinder, supra note 101 at 29 (referring to the “one-stop shopping” aspect of IDV 
courts); Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19 at 1; Levy, Ross, and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 1-2; 
Waldman, supra note 88 at 4. 
111 See Office of Policy and Planning, New York State Courts, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts”, supra note 
105. Shaffer argues that IDV courts “provide for the greatest possible efficiency and reduction in transaction costs 
by coordinating all available services, maximizing court oversight of offenders, and eliminating conflicting judicial 
orders.” See supra note 54 at note 91. 
112 “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Mission and Goals”, on-line: New York State Unified Court System, 
<http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/idv/mission_goals.shtml>; Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, 
supra note 19 at 1; Katz and Rempel, supra note 19 at 1; Ontario Court of Justice, “Integrated Domestic Violence 
Courts: Overview”, supra note 16; Waldman, supra note 88 at 3-4. 
113 These critiques are found in secondary literature, and are not always borne out in the actual evaluations of IDV 
courts, as section IIIC will show. Nevertheless, these possible concerns are important in informing criteria for 
assessment of IDV courts.      
114 Epstein, supra note 14 at 34-37; Levey, Steketee and Keilitz, supra note 60 at 14-15; MacDowell, supra note 18 
at 117-118; Violence against women sector, supra note 88 at 3-4. See also Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 
141 (writing about UFCs rather than IDV courts). 
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strict confidentiality is maintained.115 Another concern is that when criminal and family matters 
are consolidated, victims may lose control over whether to participate in criminal proceedings.116 
Even if we assume that most cases in the IDV courts will involve relationships that have broken 
down, this does not necessarily translate into an assumption that the victim will wish to pursue 
criminal charges.117 In addition to the relative informality and lack of an adversarial context that 
DV courts generally possess, the inability to judge shop on different issues may also operate to 
the detriment of litigants in IDV courts.118 On the other hand, reducing opportunities for judge 
shopping may also be a way of curtailing the manipulation of court processes and perpetuation of 
court harassment in domestic violence cases.119 
 Another potential problem is that IDV courts may result in litigation challenging 
jurisdictional and other aspects of the new model, 120 potentially delaying hearing of the 
substantive issues and thus working against the access to justice goal of IDV courts. Even taking 
their jurisdiction as a given, IDV courts are restricted in the sorts of issues they can consider and 
the remedies they can provide, which may be narrower than those available through processes 
such as mediation.121 The need for legal representation by those with sufficient expertise in 
                                                
115 Dunford-Jackson et al, ibid. 
116 See Dunford-Jackson et al, ibid at 138-139; MacDowell, supra note 18 at 115-116. This may also be a concern 
for DV courts more broadly. See Bennett, supra note 56 at 13. Provision of independent victim advocates may help 
offset this concern.  
117 See e.g. Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19 at 19, where only 37% of victims felt that 
punishment of offenders was an important goal of the IDV Court in Yonkers. 
118 MacDowell, supra note 18 at 113 (noting that where one litigant believes an IDV court judge is predisposed 
towards the other litigant because of the outcome on a particular issue, the existence of another forum may be an 
advantage).  
119 See Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 19. See also Vollens, supra note 42 at 16 (noting that judges often 
do not respond to court harassment until they see patterns of abuse). 
120 See Breger, Elkins and Fosbinder, supra note 101, §§1.6, 1:13, discussing a number of jurisdictional court 
challenges raised in relation to IDV courts.  
121 Lauren K. Williams, “The Use of Mediation as a Complement to the Integrated Domestic Violence Courts of 
New York” (2012) 13 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 713 at 728-9 (recognizing however that mediation may not be 
appropriate in all cases where there has been domestic violence).  
24 
 
family, civil and criminal matters has also been identified as a possible challenge for IDV 
courts.122  
Although the literature on IDV courts raises several issues of concern, one issue that is 
generally absent – similar to the literature on DV courts more generally – is the impact of IDV 
courts on persons who are marginalized.123 Nor are the rights of accused persons prominent in 
the IDV court literature.124 For example, a recent article on IDV courts enumerates four “key 
factors” said to be “critical … to developing and maintaining an integrated court-based response 
to domestic violence cases”: planning, training, case integrity and victim advocacy.125 Due 
process is not mentioned as a key factor, and the discussion of case integrity focuses on the 
respective roles of the victim and state rather than the accused.126 As argued above, it is critical 
that justice system responses to domestic violence, including IDV courts, focus on due process 
and procedural fairness concerns as primary considerations. Lastly, the IDV court literature 
invokes but does not define victim safety and offender accountability any more so than the 
literature on DV courts generally, nor does it deal with issues of state accountability.         
With this background in mind, the next Part will review my criteria for assessing IDV 
courts and present the results of my case study.  
 
III.  Assessing the Impact of IDV Courts: A Case Study 
A. Criteria for Assessing the Impact of IDV Courts  
                                                
122 Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 143. See also Levey, Steketee and Keilitz, supra note 60 at 11, 21. 
123 For exceptions, see Steketee, Levey and Keilitz, supra note 60 at 9 (describing the impact that judicial responses 
may have on disadvantaged groups in the context of an evaluation of an IDV court); Dalley, supra note 88 at 9 
(noting that there is a lack of information on the impact of IDV courts on marginalized groups); Violence against 
women sector, supra note 88. 
124 For an exception see Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 139, 141-2 (dealing with due process in the context 
of UFCs that include criminal jurisdiction). 
125 Aldrich and Kluger, supra note 86 at 84-5. 
126 Ibid at 84. The authors do acknowledge the importance of due process and the rights of the accused elsewhere, 
yet not as a “key factor”. 
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There have been several evaluations of DV courts in Canada127 and the U.S.,128 but fewer 
evaluations of IDV courts, with none to date in Canada.129 Some evaluations look at case 
outcomes to assess the impact that DV and IDV courts have had; others are more qualitative and 
review the impact of courts from the perspectives of litigants and other stakeholders.  
My interest is this study was in examining IDV courts through a focus on the needs and 
interests of victims, offenders, children and communities rather than institutional efficiency 
considerations, although sometimes the two will overlap.130 More specifically, I was interested in 
whether justice system structures such as IDV courts promote access to justice. In the context of 
violence against women, access to justice has been defined as “the obligation to make simple, 
rapid, adequate and impartial … recourses available, without discrimination, for the purpose of 
investigating and punishing these acts and providing redress.”131 My view is that as long as we 
maintain an approach to domestic violence that utilizes the justice system, it is worthwhile to 
consider reform efforts that might improve the justice response to domestic violence.132 
                                                
127 Tutty, Ursel and Douglas, “A Comparison of Models”, supra note 24 at 80, note that evaluations of DV courts in 
Canada are not always published or easily accessible. What’s Law Got To Do With It?, supra note 15, includes 
chapters on evaluations of DV courts in Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, and the Yukon. See also 
Salvaggio, supra note 14, writing about an evaluation of Toronto’s DV court by the Women’s Court Watch 
Program.  
128 See e.g. Picard-Fritsche et al, A National Portrait of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 16, evaluating DV 
courts in California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Washington;  R.R. Peterson, The Impact of Manhattan’s 
Specialized Domestic Violence Court (New York: New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc, 2004); Kelly 
Diffily, Kamala Mallik Kane, Lisa Newmark and Michael Rempel, Specialized Felony Domestic Violence Courts: 
Lessons on Implementation and Impact from the Kings County (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy 
Center, 2001). 
129 See Katz and Rempel, supra note 19 at 1. For examples of IDV court evaluations see e.g. Steketee, Levey, and 
Keilitz, supra note 60, evaluating Washington D.C.’s IDV Court; Sack, Creating a DV Court, supra note 47, 
examining the IDV Court in Westchester, NY as a case study; Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19, examining the 
IDV court in Queens, New York; Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19, examining the IDV court in 
Yonkers, New York; Katz and Rempel, ibid, examining IDV courts in nine New York State counties, and the Erie 
and Suffolk County IDV Court evaluations, supra note 19. 
130 For example, trial delays may impact upon victim willingness to testify. See Center for Court Innovation, 
Spotlight on Victim Safety, supra note 70.  
131 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the 
Americas, OEA/Ser L/V/II doc 68 (20 January 2007) at para 5. 
132 As argued by Weissman, supra note 65 at 1136-1137, some solutions to domestic violence can only be pursued 
through the courts, making them a worthwhile target of reform. 
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Furthermore, although the more ambitious goals of victim safety and offender accountability are 
put forward as primary objectives of DV and IDV courts, I have noted that those goals are not 
well defined, and it is difficult to evaluate whether the courts themselves are impacting 
recidivism, not to mention overall rates of domestic violence and domestic homicide.133 My 
focus is therefore on whether domestic violence cases are dealt with in ways that ensure victims 
and offenders are treated fairly, without discrimination, and have ready access to services, 
supports and remedies that are “simple, rapid, adequate and impartial”.134   
Another important measure of evaluation is whether IDV courts are having the sort of 
unintended consequences that flowed from the earlier domestic violence reforms discussed in 
Part II. More specifically, IDV courts should not pose new risks and problems for victims, 
offenders or children, and should not have an adverse impact on members of marginalized 
groups. Although the literature on DV and IDV courts has not focused on this issue, it is highly 
significant in terms of equality of access to justice.135 
I was also interested in exploring whether IDV courts can make positive change at the 
societal, systemic level, or can only provide individualized responses to domestic violence. It is 
important to examine whether the therapeutic, problem-solving model of IDV courts reinforces 
the individualization of domestic violence at the risk of undermining societal and structural 
changes, particularly since the literature focuses on individual rather than state accountability. 
Actual change at the systemic level would be difficult to measure, but the involvement of judges 
and other IDV court players in public education about domestic violence, its structural, gendered 
                                                
133 See e.g. Moore, supra note 14 at 7-8, noting the difficulties in measuring recidivism.  
134 IACHR, supra note 131 at para 5. Another issue is whether the appropriate domestic violence cases are ending up 
before the courts, which relates to the actions of police, prosecution, and child protection workers. My research was 
unable to assess this issue, and DV / IDV court evaluations have not attempted to measure it. See infra Part IV.  
135 For a discussion of equality of access to justice generally, see Canadian Bar Association, Access to Justice 
Metrics: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: CBA, 2013) at 23-24. 
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and other disproportionate aspects, and the proper role of the state in combatting it may 
nevertheless have some societal impacts.136 At the same time, arguments in favour of “court 
pluralism” suggest that the criminal, civil and family justice systems serve unique functions that 
may be lost through integration, including the normative, symbolic and educative functions of 
the criminal justice system.137  
What do New York’s IDV courts reveal about the ability of these courts to promote 
access to justice, avoid unintended consequences, and deal with domestic violence issues 
systemically?  
 
B.  IDV Courts in New York: Setting the Context  
The model for IDV courts in New York was developed by Judge Judy Harris Kluger in 
collaboration with the Center for Court Innovation in 2000, with six pilot courts established 
between 2001 and 2002 in various counties.138 The pilot courts were to focus on several key 
issues: jurisdiction; planning, staffing and technical assistance; case identification, screening and 
calendaring; legal representation; judicial monitoring and offender accountability; judicial and 
non-judicial training; technology; courthouse safety; case integrity, confidentiality and record 
keeping; domestic violence services; use of community resources; and assessment.139 After 
approval by then Chief Judge Judith Kaye, further IDV courts were introduced following the 
pilots, with intensive planning and implementation processes for each. Of the more than sixty 
                                                
136 For discussions of this sort of judicial role, see Dunford-Jackson et al, supra note 61 at 137; Salvaggio, supra 
note 14 at 16-17; Tsai, supra note 21 at 1325-1326; Turgeon, supra note 61 at 357, 361, 367. 
137 MacDowell, supra note 18 at 96.  
138 Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 4. 
139 Ibid at 4 and Appendix A. The authors note that following the pilot period, these key components were modified 
(ibid at 51). 
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DV courts in the state of New York, over half are now IDV courts.140 IDV courts in New York 
reportedly dealt with over 113,500 cases and 22,000 families in the ten year period between 2001 
and 2011.141 In New York City, IDV courts operate in all five boroughs.142  
Jurisdictionally, New York IDV courts operate as a part of the Supreme Court, and can 
hear both felony and misdemeanor criminal charges143 as well as matters handled by the Family 
Court (e.g. custody and visitation, abuse and neglect, and family offence petition / protection 
order cases) and Supreme Court (e.g. matrimonial issues).144 However, not all IDV courts in 
New York deal with all of the issues over which they have jurisdiction.145 New York IDV courts 
do not integrate case intake into their operations, as IDV courts in some other jurisdictions do; 
instead, cases are transferred from other courts.146 Specific eligibility criteria may differ amongst 
IDV courts in New York, but cases are normally eligible where they have been commenced and 
are pending in two out of three forums (criminal, family and supreme courts) and involve 
overlapping parties or witnesses.147 Cases identified for transfer to IDV courts are to be screened 
                                                
140 Center for Court Innovation, National Compendium of Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 46 at 6-10. 
According to Office of Policy and Planning, New York State Courts, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: 
Overview”, supra note 105, there are currently 46 IDV courts in New York state. 
141 “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Overview”, ibid. 
142 See e.g. New York State Unified Court System, NYS Supreme Court, Criminal term, NY County 1st JD, on-line: 
New York Courts, <http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/criminal/IDV.shtml> (on the Manhattan IDV Court).   
143 In New York, there are no specific offences related to domestic violence, and the general offences of assault, 
stalking, etc apply. See NY Penal Code § 120. 
144 Breger, Elkins and Fosbinder, supra note 101, §1:6, citing People v. Correa, 15 NY3d 213 (2010, Court of 
Appeals) (affirming the jurisdiction of the Chief Judge to establish IDV courts at the Supreme Court level and to 
handle misdemeanor as well as felony charges under Article VI of the New York Constitution, which established a 
unified court system in New York).      
145 For example, Manhattan’s IDV Court does not currently handle abuse and neglect cases. See infra Part IV.B. 
Child support issues are dealt with by support magistrates for jurisdictional reasons, but IDV courts may still be 
involved, e.g. by making temporary orders. See Judy Reichler and Liberty Aldrich, Child Support Protocol: A Guide 
for Integrated Domestic Violence Courts (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2004) at 4-8. 
146 See Epstein, supra note 14 at 28, indicating that at the time of her article, only 3 IDV courts took an approach 
that integrated intake (in the District of Columbia, Florida and Hawaii).  
147 See New York State Unified Court System, “Integrated Domestic Violence Courts: Key Principles”, on-line: 
New York Courts, <http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/idv/key_principles.shtml>, noting that 
“criminal allegations of domestic violence should form the threshold requirement for entry into the IDV Court.” But 
see e.g. Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 24-25, for an example of an IDV Court 
focusing on matrimonial cases as a key eligibility requirement because of local needs.  
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within five days of receiving the files to determine if the transfer will promote the administration 
of justice (which is not defined in the materials available).148 If so, transfer to an IDV court is 
made, where the cases proceed according to the rules of the court where the action was originally 
commenced.149 Cases that arise subsequently between the same parties may also be litigated in 
the IDV court.150 
 
C.  Manhattan’s IDV Court: A Case Study 
In this section, I investigate Manhattan’s IDV Court as a case study, based on courtroom 
observations and interviews with justice system and institutional representatives and victim, 
offender and children’s advocates involved in the implementation and operation of the IDV 
courts in New York. I conducted semi-structured interviews in person and by telephone from 
November 2011 through January 2012 with nine victim, offender and children’s advocates 
(lawyers and social workers) and four justice sector / institutional representatives (judges and 
administrators) in Manhattan, many of whom worked in and were familiar with the IDV courts in 
the other boroughs as well. Unfortunately, in spite of several attempts I was not able to conduct 
interviews with anyone from the District Attorney’s office or the NYPD.151 Interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, and then coded for themes.  
                                                
148 See Part 141, Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, §141.4(a)(2), on-line: New York Courts, 
<http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/141-1_amend2.pdf>. One interviewee questioned whether this five day 
turnaround was being met (see infra note 151).  
149 Breger, Elkins and Fosbinder, supra note 101 at §§1:6, 1:13, and Part 141, Rules of the Chief Administrator of the 
Courts, ibid, §141.5(b). 
150 See e.g. Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 24, distinguishing between 
“qualifying” and “additional” cases. 
151 Based on ethics requirements, interviewees are anonymous and identified as “Justice Interviewee X” (including 
judges and other justice sector and institutional personnel) or “Advocate Interviewee X” (including lawyers and 
social workers serving the needs of victims, offenders and children). The interview schedule is attached as Appendix 
A, and is based on the interview schedule used in an evaluation of Calgary’s DV Court. See Tutty et al, Calgary D V 
Court Evaluation Report, supra note 59, Appendix 5. 
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It must be emphasized that this is not a full evaluation of the IDV court;152 I did not 
review court files to obtain quantitative data on case numbers and outcomes, nor did I interview 
victims and offenders. Although my sample is small, the qualitative interviews and courtroom 
observations shed useful light on the Manhattan IDV Court and how it fares in terms of access to 
justice, avoiding unintended consequences, and responding to domestic violence systemically 
from the perspectives of actors involved in its operations. As noted by one author, qualitative 
methods can uniquely probe issues of “court culture and function rather than case outcomes”.153 
Qualitative methods are also important for exploring issues that are not statistically verifiable, 
such as the impact of IDV courts on members of marginalized groups.154 In addition, 
interviewing both institutional representatives and advocates allowed me to compare their 
perspectives, with some interesting differences of opinion. I compare my findings to the 
outcomes of recent evaluations of other IDV courts in New York in the next section, which 
provides some support for the observations I make here. 
 Manhattan’s IDV Court commenced operations in 2007, and has been presided over since 
its inception by Judge Tandra L. Dawson. Judge Dawson formerly worked as an Assistant 
District Attorney in the Bronx from 1983 to 1998, sat as a Family Court judge in the Bronx from 
1998 to 2007, and was Acting Justice in the Bronx County IDV Court from 2002 to 2007. She 
was also a member of the New York Bar Association’s Domestic Violence Task Force from 
2003 to 2006, and a member of the Black Bar Association in Bronx County from 1984 to 
                                                
152 There has not yet been a full evaluation of Manhattan’s IDV Court. More generally, see Katz and Rempel, supra 
note 19 at 1, noting that “the existing research on IDV courts is limited”. 
153 MacDowell, supra note 18 at n 11. This was confirmed by Justice Interviewee # 1, supra note 148, who noted 
that the mindfulness of case outcomes can only be determined qualitatively. See also Access to Justice Metrics, 
supra note 135 at 5-6 (noting the importance of stakeholder perspectives in assessing justice system effectiveness in 
the access to justice context). 
154 This is not to say that the impact of courts on marginalized groups is not statistically verifiable, but such statistics 
are not currently being kept by the Manhattan IDV court.  
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2005.155 The Manhattan IDV Court operates out of the New York State Supreme Court, Criminal 
Division premises in lower Manhattan. Like most IDV courts, it has a Resource Coordinator, 
Court Attorney, victim advocates (through Safe Horizon, which has facilities on-site), children’s 
advocates (who provide independent legal representation to children), and other dedicated staff 
and attorneys. Its proceedings are open to the public, and it has separate calendars for criminal, 
family and matrimonial cases, with criminal cases being called first. It does not currently deal 
with child abuse and neglect matters, and conducts only bench trials and not jury trials in the 
criminal area.156  
Interviewees were asked for their impressions of why IDV courts had developed in New 
York, and the processes and challenges around development and implementation. Several goals 
or rationales for integration were repeatedly mentioned: the need to reduce conflicting orders 
between criminal, family and supreme courts and provide more information to judges, litigants, 
and other court personnel;157 the need to streamline and centralize court processes and services in 
domestic violence cases and improve access to justice for litigants158 (although some justice 
sector interviewees indicated that reduced time to disposition was not a goal of New York IDV 
courts);159 and the need to recognize the unique nature of domestic violence cases and the 
multiplicity and connectedness of issues those cases raise.160 Victim safety, offender 
accountability, and “justice for all litigants” were also noted as goals of New York’s IDV 
courts.161  
                                                
155 New York State Unified Court System, Judicial Directory, on-line: New York Courts, 
<http://www.nycourtsystem.com/applications/judicialdirectory/Bio.php?ID=7028848>.  
156 Justice Interviewees 1, 4, supra note 151. 
157 Advocate Interviewees 4, 5, 6, 7, ibid; Justice Interviewees 2, 3, 4, ibid.  
158 Advocate Interviewees 6, 7, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, ibid. 
159 Justice Interviewees 1, 4, ibid. 
160 Advocate Interviewees 1, 4, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 4, ibid. 
161 Justice Interviewee 4, ibid. 
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Another perspective was that domestic violence provided a concrete context in which the 
New York State court system could push for unification of the courts more broadly.162 As a 
result, the development of IDV courts in New York was led by the courts rather than the 
community, an approach that one interviewee described as “top-down” while still (along with 
others) acknowledging the crucial leadership of particular judges committed to improving the 
justice response to domestic violence through integration.163 Community and justice system 
stakeholders did participate in the start-up of the IDV courts, as did the Center for Court 
Innovation.164 Interviewees noted that there were initially concerns expressed by prosecutors, 
defence attorneys and victims’ advocates about potential issues flowing from integration, such as 
due process concerns arising out of more information sharing, the dilution of both the family and 
criminal aspects of domestic violence by virtue of being linked to each other, and lack of human 
resources to service the courts.165 Most of the justice sector interviewees expressed the view that 
these issues had been addressed by New York’s IDV courts and that there was broad stakeholder 
buy-in.166 While most advocate interviewees agreed that the IDV courts had made efforts to 
respond to concerns, they raised lingering problems with the courts that will be noted below.   
 Both advocate and justice sector interviewees identified several advantages of the IDV 
courts in New York and improvements they have made to the more traditional, siloed approach 
to domestic violence. Almost all interviewees indicated that New York’s IDV courts had 
achieved their goal of avoiding inconsistent orders, and I saw several examples of the efforts 
                                                
162 Advocate Interviewees 1, 4, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 3, ibid. See also Cissner, Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, 
Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 1, noting the “particular resonance” of IDV courts in New York because the state 
has “one of the most complicated trial court structures in the country.”  
163 Advocate Interviewees 1, 6, ibid; Justice Interviewee 1, ibid. 
164 Advocate Interviewee 6, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 4, ibid.  
165 Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, ibid. 
166 Justice Interviewees 2, 3, 4, ibid. 
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made in this regard during my courtroom observations.167 There was also broad agreement that 
IDV courts had met their goal of providing better logistical coordination, for example regarding 
court appearances and timely access to information such as compliance reports, as well as better 
communication and collaboration between the players who did not tend to see each other when 
their matters were heard in in different courts. These improvements were seen to have access to 
justice advantages for litigants, for example in accommodating work and other schedules and 
avoiding delays.168 I noted the great care taken around scheduling in my observations of 
Manhattan’s IDV court; for example matters were sometimes adjourned until later the same 
morning to avoid multiple trips to court. The perception of interviewees was that litigants 
generally have to appear in court less often, there are shorter adjourn dates between appearances, 
and they (and their advocates) spend less time making trips to different courts and  re-telling 
their stories, which were seen as access to justice advantages as well.169  
Some interviewees also indicated that victims seemed to be more willing to participate in 
the IDV court process, and it is easier to connect them to advocates.170 Furthermore, the interests 
of children were better represented through the constant presence of independent children’s 
advocates in the IDV court, as well as the court’s ability to have a fuller picture when 
considering and monitoring visitation. Avoiding multiple trips to court and mandating treatment 
may also facilitate job retention and payment of child support.171 Greater availability of services 
for victims, offenders and children were noted as benefits, and the role of the court’s Resource 
Coordinator was lauded in this respect.172 Better monitoring of offenders by keeping matters on 
                                                
167 Advocate Interviewees 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, ibid. One interviewee suggested that 
inconsistency was not necessarily a problem provided that it was mindful. 
168 Advocate Interviewees 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 3, 4, ibid.  
169 Advocate Interviewees 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, ibid. 
170 Advocate Interviewee 5, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 3, 4, ibid. 
171 Advocate Interviewees 1, 5, 6, 7,8, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 3, 4, ibid.  
172 Advocate Interviewees 5, 7, 9, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 4, ibid. 
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the IDV court calendar following disposition was also identified, although it was acknowledged 
that this may result in more court appearances.173 It was also noted that retaining matters on the 
IDV court calendar may increase opportunities for victim participation (although victims do not 
always need to be present).174 Perhaps most importantly, many interviewees felt that IDV court 
judges, lawyers and other players, because of their knowledge, expertise and commitment, 
displayed greater sensitivity to domestic violence issues than other courts, resulting in more 
thoughtful outcomes.175 However, there was some disagreement here, with some advocates 
suggesting a lack of understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence on the part of children’s 
lawyers and defence attorneys,176 and one advocate suggesting a lack of sensitivity on the part of 
the Court around the abuse of men by women.177    
 There were differing perspectives on the ability of IDV courts to deal with the needs of 
marginalized litigants and communities. On the positive side, the role of organizations serving 
these needs in bringing issues to the attention of the court was noted, along with the availability 
of specialized services and the diversity of court personnel.178 Others mentioned the court’s 
sensitivity to the needs of immigrants and litigants who spoke English as a second language, 
although it was also indicated that translation services were often subpar.179 Many interviewees 
were skeptical about whether IDV courts could serve the needs of marginalized groups better 
than other courts, believing that this was often dependent on the particular judge.180 Others 
thought that IDV courts were taking the right approach by treating all litigants the same, 
                                                
173 Advocate Interviewees 7, 8, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 3, 4, ibid. In my observations I noted that the Court 
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regardless of their identity.181 Perhaps most concerning was the anecdotal observation that 
certain populations are not seen very often in the Manhattan IDV court, including LGBT, 
African American, and elderly litigants,182 and the acknowledgement that the IDV Court is not 
keeping statistics on this basis.183  
 Opinions also differed on whether IDV courts have made an impact in terms of 
emphasizing domestic violence as a societal rather than individual problem. Some interviewees 
suggested that the mere existence of IDV courts indicated a commitment to dealing with 
domestic violence as a societal problem and showed that domestic violence should be treated 
both as more than a family matter and as more than a crime.184 The involvement of the 
Manhattan IDV Court in public legal education and outreach was also noted in this regard,185 
although others questioned whether the level of such outreach was sufficient and suggested that 
the Court was fairly insular.186 Many interviewees felt that IDV courts had not made much of an 
impact in dealing with the root causes of domestic violence, nor in terms of recidivism, reporting 
levels or the police response to domestic violence (including dual arrests).187 However, one 
defence attorney stated that she had not represented nor seen very many females charged with 
criminal matters in the IDV courts, perhaps suggesting fewer dual arrests.188     
Other, more specific problems and challenges were identified with respect to the 
Manhattan IDV court. For example, although some interviewees indicated that the court 
                                                
181 Advocate Interviewees 7, 8, ibid. 
182 Advocate Interviewee 9, ibid. (as opposed to poor and Hispanic victims and offenders, who were said to appear 
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183 However, the Center for Court Innovation is involved in a self-assessment project with DV and IDV courts in 
New York that is attempting to measure the courts’ impact on marginalized populations (Justice Interviewees 1, 3, 
ibid). 
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185 Justice Interviewee 3, ibid.  
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provided better information sharing, it appears that this largely accrues to judges and other 
justice system personnel, as many advocates noted that their clients lacked basic information 
about the process (particularly for transfer) and would benefit from an orientation or better 
informational resources.189 Some advocates provide this information to litigants themselves, but 
also see a role for the court to play. I noted this issue during my courtroom observations – even 
with my legal training and litigation experience in domestic violence matters (albeit in another 
jurisdiction), it was sometimes difficult to follow the proceedings. While some interviewees 
mentioned the advantages of cross-training for lawyers so that they could act in criminal, civil 
and family matters,190 others indicated attorneys’ lack of expertise or lack of willingness to 
undertake family matters.191 Similarly, the Manhattan IDV Court’s relative lack of expertise on 
matrimonial matters was noted, as well as the need for it to consider domestic violence more 
seriously in limiting batterers’ visitation rights and in batterers’ use of the court to perpetrate 
further abuse.192 The need for more intensive, ongoing training – including training on the needs 
of marginalized individuals and groups – was recommended for judges, advocates, police, 
forensic evaluators, and supervised visitation providers, both in IDV courts and more broadly. 
On the latter point, the risk of IDV courts becoming “pink ghettos” was noted as a rationale for 
ensuring broader training on domestic violence issues.193           
Interviewees also had concerns about the lack of full integration of domestic violence 
matters and the ways in which integration (or lack thereof) affected progress on particular issues. 
The fact that the Manhattan IDV Court does not hear abuse and neglect cases was seen as an 
issue, especially given some of the historical problems with child protection issues in domestic 
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violence cases, as well as the delays caused by having these issues dealt with in family court. 
Some interviewees questioned why, if the reason for not hearing these cases was one of 
insufficient resources, the IDV court was about to begin hearing cases of sexual abuse and took 
the time to hear additional criminal matters it considered relevant to the resolution of domestic 
violence matters (such as drug charges). Others expressed the opinion that the failure to take on 
abuse and neglect cases had more to do with the child protection agency’s unwillingness to 
participate in IDV court.194 Interviewees also observed that the Manhattan IDV Court dealt with 
few felonies, and conducted few criminal trials, again suggesting that the court’s full jurisdiction 
was not being used.195  
Lack of resources and cutbacks were widely cited as problematic, and in particular the 
new limits on funded supervised visitation were seen as a significant challenge, along with lack 
of funding for training, outreach and evaluation.196 Perhaps related to resource issues, 
interviewees mentioned the perceived pressure to resolve and settle matters quickly.197 In my 
courtroom observations, I noted a good deal of informal mediation from the bench.  At the same 
time, matters may move more slowly in IDV court, due to the time lag for transfer, the need to 
process criminal matters first for due process reasons, the intensive monitoring conducted by the 
court, and the often gradual approach to allowing visitation rights.198 As foreseen in the 
literature, the ways in which information from the IDV Court’s criminal and family calendars 
may influence the resolution of other matters was also noted by interviewees, which may cause 
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196 Advocate Interviewees 6, 7, 8, ibid; Justice Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, ibid.  
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concerns for both victims and offenders.199 One victim’s advocate suggested that information 
seepage may actually facilitate court-based harassment when offenders seize upon adverse 
credibility findings against the victim and use this opportunity to make false allegations, 
although others believed that IDV courts are better placed to identify and respond to such 
situations. Another advocate interviewee, a defence attorney, noted how the IDV court’s decision 
to hear related criminal matters such as drug charges might also negatively affect her clients. 200 
Insufficient security and privacy for litigants and their advocates was mentioned as a 
problem as well, with one advocate noting that her clients would prefer to have family matters 
resolved in a closed courtroom and others decrying the lack of private meeting space for lawyers 
and their clients.201 I also made note of privacy concerns during my courtroom observations – 
litigants and their advocates often chatted about their cases on the benches in the courtroom, 
apparently because of a lack of meeting space in the facilities where the Manhattan IDV court 
sits. On the other hand, one justice interviewee suggested that hearing domestic violence matters 
in open court might allow more family members to attend and demystify the process for the 
public.202 Efforts also appeared to be made to protect victims’ safety through the protection of 
personal information.203  
 In addition to those recommendations already noted, interviewees advocated better 
oversight and availability of supervised visitation providers, and certification of other service 
providers funded by the state;204 more comprehensive services (for example legal representation 
and assistance with child support and protection order petitions), including services integrated in 
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the courthouse;205 alternatives to batterer treatment programs, and better availability of such 
programs in multiple languages;206 more collaboration, stakeholder meetings and outreach;207 
and more ongoing reflection and evaluation by the IDV courts.208 Within the limits of what 
courts can actually achieve in the context of domestic violence, the potential for IDV courts to be 
leaders in reforming the justice system’s response was also identified as a worthy goal.209  
 
D.  New York IDV Court Evaluations  
A number of evaluations of New York IDV courts were released in July 2012, and along with 
earlier evaluations, they confirm many of the observations of the advocates, justice and 
institutional personnel I interviewed about the benefits and challenges of IDV courts. In the two 
evaluations where litigant satisfaction was surveyed, respondents noted that IDV courts have the 
advantages of reducing inconsistent orders, and improving access to information, communication 
and collaboration and the availability of services.210 Victims interviewed in Queens favourably 
commented on the access to justice aspect of the IDV court in that they required fewer days off 
work and less running around.211 These were all noted as advantages of the Manhattan IDV 
Court in my interviews. Interestingly, however, the studies measuring quantitative data found 
that even though they resulted in fewer trips to court, many IDV courts actually required more 
court appearances overall and a longer time to disposition than non-IDV courts.212  
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The qualitative studies also interviewed litigants for their perceptions about the fairness 
of IDV courts, another aspect of access to justice.  A majority of victims in Queens felt that the 
IDV court process was “generally fair”,213 although other victims believed that their voices had 
not been adequately heard or their circumstances fully taken into account by the Queens IDV 
Court.214 Some concerns were also expressed by victims about their experiences with assistant 
district attorneys, law guardians (children’s lawyers) and police.215 In the Yonkers IDV Court 
evaluation, 59% of victims reported that their cases had been dealt with fairly, compared to only 
44% of offenders (with 26% of offenders strongly disagreeing). The overall results showed that 
55% of litigants believed they had been listened to carefully, and 53% felt that the judge had 
accounted for their opinions in decision making.216 Similar to the results from my interviews in 
Manhattan, some concerns were expressed in both Queens and Yonkers about lack of 
understanding of the IDV court process.217 In Queens, it was noted that this was a particular 
concern for women with poor literacy and English language skills.218  
In terms of IDV court processes, a large majority of litigants surveyed in Yonkers 
believed that the information from family matters had been used in criminal cases and vice 
versa.219 Victims were more likely to think that having all of their matters heard by a single judge 
                                                                                                                                                       
Picard-Fritsche and Puffett, Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 35-38 (finding that cases in the Suffolk County IDV 
Court took longer to resolve and required more court appearances than the comparison sample, although fewer 
overall trips to court were required). See also Picard-Fritsche, Cissner and Puffett, Erie County, supra note 19 at 27-
30 (finding that cases in the Erie County IDV Court took slightly longer to resolve, but required fewer court 
appearances and fewer overall trips to court than the comparison sample). Time for case transfers to IDV court alone 
did not explain the results in any of these studies.  
213 Levy, Ross and Guthrie, supra note 19 at 16. 
214 Ibid at 16-17. Many of the women reportedly relied on their attorneys to speak for them, and also had concerns 
about how they had been represented. The authors note that dissatisfaction with court fairness was often related to 
dissatisfaction with case outcomes (ibid at 17-18). 
215 Ibid at 23-25. 
216 Picard-Fritsche, Litigant Perspectives, supra note 19 at 12-13. 
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218 Levy, Ross and Guthrie, ibid.  
219 See also Suffolk County, supra note 19 at 41, where it was noted that non-carceral sentences are more frequent in 
IDV courts, perhaps because of better knowledge of family issues such as child support obligations. 
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was advantageous in this respect,220 as well as (in Queens) reducing possibilities for offenders to 
manipulate court processes (although the Queens report also found that dual charges do occur in 
IDV court).221 This is similar to my interviews in Manhattan, where information seepage and the 
inability to judge shop were seen as potential advantages by some interviewees, but concerns 
were expressed by one victim advocate and a defence attorney. On the other hand, in Suffolk 
County, interviews with defence attorneys indicated that they were not particularly concerned 
about such due process issues, perhaps because they were satisfied with case outcomes.222 The 
perceived pressure to settle that was noted by some interviewees in Manhattan was confirmed by 
the quantitative studies, which found that family cases in some New York IDV courts are more 
likely to settle than in non-IDV courts.223  In contrast to Manhattan, courthouse security and 
privacy concerns were not as prominent in Queens and Yonkers, although there was still a sense 
that more could be done in Queens.224 There was support for existing services such as victim 
advocates in Queens and Yonkers, but the need for enhanced services and a lack of resources 
were also noted as problems.225 None of the evaluations dealt with the question of whether IDV 
courts were responding to domestic violence systemically, or in terms of responding to the needs 
of marginalized populations. 
  
 IV.  Discussion: Considering IDV Courts in Canada 
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Canada has a fair amount of experience with criminal DV courts, but much less so with IDV 
courts. As indicated in the literature review in Part II, specialized DV courts may make some 
improvements in the criminal realm, but they do not respond to the concerns with a fragmented 
approach to domestic violence issues. This Part will review the challenges and benefits of 
introducing IDV courts in Canada as a means of dealing with those concerns, based on the 
results of my case study. It will also identify areas for further research.  
One potential challenge to introducing IDV courts in Canada is that in those provinces 
without unified family courts,226 jurisdiction over criminal, civil, and family matters that arise in 
the domestic violence context is complex , with matters constitutionally and administratively 
divided between superior and provincial / territorial courts, and sometimes, different divisions of 
those courts.227 Only Canadian jurisdictions with or willing to implement unified courts could 
establish IDV courts that follow the New York model, where all criminal, civil and family 
matters are, at least in theory, integrated at the superior court level. Currently, unified courts only 
exist in certain locations in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
PEI, and Newfoundland and Labrador, and they are only unified with respect to family 
matters.228 The full implementation of IDV courts would require expansion of the jurisdiction of 
UFCs to include civil and criminal matters as well. This would likely require amendments to 
civil domestic violence legislation, which typically grants jurisdiction to provincial / territorial 
courts and judicial officers to grant protection orders on a round the clock, ex parte basis, with 
superior court review of such orders on notice to the respondent.229 If IDV courts were to take 
                                                
226 There are no unified family courts (UFCs) in the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta or Quebec, and in some 
other provinces, not all cities have UFCs. See Unified Family Court Summative Evaluation, supra note 97 at 7. 
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jurisdiction over civil protection orders, that might undermine victims’ access to such orders 
(assuming that IDV courts will sit regular business hours only). This would favour concurrent 
rather than exclusive jurisdiction over civil protection orders. Amendments to the Criminal Code 
would be required for fully integrated IDV court jurisdiction as well, given the shared 
jurisdiction between provincial / territorial and superior courts over domestic violence related 
offences.230  
UFCs require provincial and federal agreement, and expansion of the current number of 
UFCs has met with some resistance. This resistance has been attributed to both levels of 
government at different times, often for financial reasons, as well as to some senior members of 
the judiciary.231  In jurisdictions without UFCs, IDV courts would have to operate at either the 
provincial / territorial or superior court level, which would preclude the full integration of civil, 
criminal and family matters. This would also preclude some of the access to justice advantages 
of full integration, as evidenced by my case study.232 Even where UFCs exist, they are usually 
confined to urban centres, although some jurisdictions (such as New Brunswick) operate UFCs 
across the province.233 Full IDV courts in the U.S. are also largely confined to urban settings, but 
integration may be implemented in less comprehensive ways in rural areas.234 Although it may 
appear impractical to establish IDV courts in rural areas or small communities, these areas are 
                                                
230 Canada does not have separate criminal offences for domestic violence, and offenders are typically charged with 
offences of criminal harassment, uttering threats, assault, and sexual assault. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, 
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often serviced by single judges, who would be well placed to implement a one judge – one 
family model (provided they had the requisite unified jurisdiction).  
Another jurisdictional issue in the Canadian context is that of Aboriginal peoples and 
their engagement with the criminal, civil and family justice systems. Rates of domestic violence 
against Aboriginal women are continually reported as disproportionately high,235 and Aboriginal 
men are generally over-represented in the criminal justice system.236 Although there have been 
some efforts at developing Aboriginal justice processes,237 domestic violence charges against 
Aboriginal peoples are still dealt with in the regular criminal courts (including specialized DV 
courts in jurisdictions where they exist). Provincial domestic violence legislation likely applies to 
Aboriginal peoples, although some provisions, including those relating to exclusive possession 
of the matrimonial home, likely do not apply on First Nations reserves.238 Child apprehension 
has been a significant issue for Aboriginal families,239 and most jurisdictions now include special 
provisions relating to Aboriginal children in their child welfare legislation.240 The legal context 
surrounding domestic violence for Aboriginal families is thus even more complex, and until such 
time as Aboriginal peoples are given sovereignty over their own justice processes, these issues 
would need to be considered in thinking about the application of IDV courts to Aboriginal 
litigants.241  
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240 See for example Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C.11, s1(2). 
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As noted, Toronto has the only IDV Court in Canada at present, which hears some family 
law matters in addition to summary conviction criminal charges related to domestic violence.242  
The Toronto IDV Court commenced operations in June 2011 as a two year pilot study. 
According to Justice Geraldine Waldman, who was involved in the start-up of the Court, the 
Court was modeled on IDV Courts in jurisdictions including New York, in particular in 
Buffalo.243 The Court was developed in consultation with a community board, and has as its 
goals “better informed judicial decision making”, “elimination of conflicting orders”, “consistent 
handling of multiple matters relating to a single family by judges who are knowledgeable in the 
area of domestic violence”, “connection to social services and other community resources”, 
promotion of “efficiencies for both the system and the family by reducing the number of 
appearances in court and trips to court”, development of “expertise within the court” and the 
creation of “services and resources designed specifically for the unique needs of the client 
base.”244 Toronto does not have a unified family court; the IDV Court operates at the provincial 
court level (the Ontario Court of Justice) and does not have jurisdiction to handle divorce or 
matrimonial property issues, nor is it exercising jurisdiction to hear child protection matters. 245 
Litigants are eligible for the Toronto IDV Court where they have concurrent criminal and family 
litigation involving domestic violence. Originally, consent of both parties was required for 
transfer to IDV Court, but that element has been removed; consent of the family court case 
                                                
242 Only family law matters under the Children’s Law Reform Act and Family Law Act are heard by the Toronto IDV 
Court. See Practice Direction Regarding the Integrated Domestic Violence Court at 311 Jarvis Street, Toronto; on-
line: Ontario Court of Justice, < http://www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/legal-professionals/practice-directions/toronto-
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243 Waldman, supra note 88 at 2. 
244 Ibid at 3-4. 
245 See “Integrated Domestic Violence Court: Overview”, supra note 16. Ontario’s proposed civil domestic violence 
legislation, the Domestic Violence Protection Act, SO 2000, c 33, was never proclaimed and has now been repealed, 
so legislative civil protection orders are not within the court’s mandate (although the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c 
F.3, s 46, does provide for restraining orders). 
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management judge is required where that judge has been actively involved in the case prior to 
the proposed transfer.246   
An evaluation of the Toronto IDV Court is underway, built in to the pilot aspect of the 
Court.247 In the meantime, it is useful to consider what my case study of Manhattan’s IDV court 
indicates about the benefits and challenges of implementing IDV courts in the Canadian context. 
Because the Toronto IDV Court model is different from that in New York in light of the absence 
of unified court jurisdiction in Toronto, my case study may offer different insights in any event. 
In terms of benefits, the reduction of inconsistent court orders and increased coordination 
in civil, criminal and family matters is a clear advantage over the fragmented approach, and one 
that is supported by my case study and the 2012 evaluations of New York IDV courts. This has 
been one of the major objectives of IDV courts, and it does appear to be realized in practice. To 
the extent that conflicting orders cause confusion and further court appearances, and threaten the 
safety of victims and children, this is an important impact of the New York IDV courts and one 
with access to justice benefits. There are alternative ways of responding to the problem of 
inconsistent orders and lack of coordination, such as better communication systems between 
criminal and family courts at different levels,248as well as case management in a one judge / one 
family model within particular courts.249 However, these alternatives may be subject to the 
initiatives of individual judges, and do not involve the same level of cross-system coordination 
that IDV courts provide.    
                                                
246 Practice Direction Regarding the Integrated Domestic Violence Court, supra note 242.  
247 See Waldman, supra note 88 at 4. 
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Another benefit of IDV courts supported by my case study are the access to justice 
advantages flowing from more coordinated court appearances in a single location with a 
consistent judge. These potential benefits can only be fully realized in jurisdictions with unified 
court systems that exercise jurisdiction over all of the matters they have power to deal with; 
otherwise litigants will still be required to appear in different courts with different judges with 
the consequent possibilities of delay, inconsistency, confusion, and court harassment. My 
interviews and the recent IDV court evaluations from New York indicate that there may also be 
challenges in ensuring access to justice in IDV courts, including access to understandable 
information about the litigation process, the need for effective legal representation and 
translation, protections of privacy and security, and more attention to the needs of members of 
marginalized groups, as well as monitoring of the use of the courts by such groups. There is also 
a need to be mindful of the potential for longer times to disposition that IDV courts may 
introduce, which may undermine access to justice goals. Implementing a model with an intake 
component may offset this concern to some extent, and may deal with some of the uncertainties 
litigants face in the transfer process.250 Still, if intensive judicial monitoring is to be undertaken, 
which is one of the hallmarks of IDV courts, longer engagements with the court may be 
inevitable.   
Another beneficial aspect of IDV courts confirmed by my interviews is the court’s ability 
to deal with multiple issues and grant multiple remedies in one setting, based on more holistic 
information about the litigants and their families and expertise in domestic violence issues. It is 
difficult to envision how this particular benefit – which also relates to access to justice in terms 
of fairness of outcomes – could be replicated in a system that maintained a fragmented approach 
                                                
250 Epstein argues that “until intake and case processing of civil and criminal cases are integrated into a single, 
coordinated system, the problems inherent in today’s justice system cannot be resolved effectively” see supra note 
14 at 28. 
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to domestic violence. At the same time, access to more information by the court may have 
unintended negative consequences. My interviews and the recent IDV court evaluations in New 
York indicate that this is a particular issue for offenders, but may also have negative impacts on 
victims. This concern was raised by members of the violence against women sector in its 
comments on the proposal for an IDV court in Toronto as well.251 A related challenge is the 
pressure to resolve and settle matters quickly, which may affect substantive outcomes. 
Jurisdictions intending to implement IDV courts should be vigilant about these potential 
consequences, although only if they threaten due process and outcomes (as opposed to curtailing 
abuse of process).  Judicial training may be one mechanism for responding to these concerns. 
Other possible challenges arising from the implementation of IDV courts that were 
identified in my case study include the need for adequate expertise and continued training of 
judges, court staff and lawyers in criminal, civil and family matters and on domestic violence 
issues more broadly, which may be a problem if there is a lack of adequate resources. The 
tendency of Canadian DV courts to use rotating rather than dedicated judges would also need to 
be addressed, as the IDV court model is by definition a one judge / one family approach. The 
potential problems with segregating domestic violence issues into a single court that were 
identified in the literature and in my interviews are also a concern, which could be addressed in 
part by ensuring adequate training on domestic violence issues in other courts.  
Further research is required on the impact of IDV courts on police, prosecution and child 
protection authorities’ handling of domestic violence cases. My interviews indicated that this 
impact – which is critical to examine in light of the unintended consequences flowing from 
earlier justice system reforms – is not being measured in New York, and the recent IDV court 
evaluations confirm this assessment. Full integration of all domestic violence matters would 
                                                
251 Violence against women sector, supra note 88 at 3-4. 
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allow judicial oversight over the actions of these state actors to determine whether the proper 
cases and issues are ending up before IDV courts, or are the result of, for example, improper dual 
arrests or overzealous child welfare authorities. Given the literature documenting the adverse 
impact of these consequences on marginalized groups in earlier reforms, this is another reason to 
measure the impact of IDV courts on such groups. These are important issues of state 
accountability and systemic integration which should be addressed by IDV courts.  
In terms of systemic and societal benefits, my case study suggests that IDV courts have 
had some impact, especially in their holistic approach to domestic violence, which sends the 
important message that domestic violence has multiple impacts that cross typical justice system 
boundaries. However, more could be done. To be truly impactful, IDV courts should develop 
ways to engage with the broader community on domestic violence issues to ensure as much 
systemic impact as possible, and to prevent the potential for IDV courts to dilute the unique roles 
played by the different courts in a pluralistic system. Community engagement should involve the 
violence against women sector and include representation from members of marginalized groups. 
Although jurisdictions such as Ontario and BC have other initiatives in place to provide public 
education and awareness on domestic violence issues,252 such initiatives could be strengthened 
through the involvement of DV and IDV court personnel, who can take a leadership role in this 
area given their expertise and power. This would serve to reinforce the symbolic and educative 
roles of the justice system, and help to avoid the potential privatizing effects of IDV courts. 
At the same time, it must be recognized that there is only so much that courts can do to 
respond to domestic violence. We must not lose sight of the need for broader social and 
                                                
252 Ontario, Domestic Violence Action Plan Progress Report (Ontario, 2012), on-line: Government of Ontario, 
<http://www.women.gov.on.ca/english/resources/publications/dvap2012/DVAPReport_May2012_eng.pdf> at 9-10; 
Katherine R. Rossiter, Domestic Violence Prevention and Reduction in British Columbia (2000-2010) (Vancouver: 
Justice Institute of BC, 2011) at 30-33. 
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economic change and resources to respond to the root causes and impacts of domestic violence. 
Overall, although there are many benefits that IDV courts and the one judge / one family model 
might have in Canada, it is important that these courts not be seen as a one stop answer to 





Justice/Community Stakeholder Interview Schedule 
Manhattan IDV Court 
 
1.) Describe your agency and/or organization and what services you provide for those 
affected by domestic abuse. 
2.) How is your agency connected/affiliated with the Integrated DV Court?  
3.) In your view, why initially did the Integrated DV Court develop? 
• What problems was it developed to address? 
• What challenges (if any) did it face in getting up and running? 
• Have there been any ongoing challenges or problems? 
• What has been working well? 
 
4.) In general, how would you compare the performance of the justice system before and 
after the creation of the Integrated DV Court? How has it made a difference? Did it make 
a difference in:  
• identifying domestic violence as a societal problem 
• police response to domestic violence 
• faster processing of domestic violence cases 
• access to justice advantages 
• breadth of remedies 
• avoidance of inconsistent orders / filling gaps 
• case outcomes 
• impact for victims 
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• impact for offenders 
• use of specialized personnel 
• response to needs of diverse populations 
• sector collaborations  
• increased reporting of domestic violence 
• recidivism 
 
5.) Do you have suggestions about how the Integrated DV Court could improve its response 
to domestic abuse?  
 
6.) Do you have other comments or concerns about the Integrated DV Court?  
 
7.) Do you have any additional comments or concerns about the broader justice system 
response to domestic violence? 
 
Thank you for your time. 
 
